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This research identifies and characterizes a U.S.-centric counter nuclear 
smuggling network in Europe, and recommends ways to improve its cooperation and 
effectiveness. The purpose is to provide USSOCOM, NSHQ, and the larger 
counterproliferation (CP) community with an understanding of how the current network 
functions, its strengths and weaknesses, and how it can be improved. The research starts 
by examining prominent theories of international relations to understand cooperation 
within the network. Afterward, social network analysis (SNA) is used to define the 
Counter Nuclear Smuggling–Europe (CNS-E) network and characterize its structure. 
Lastly, the function of the network is assessed using realistic vignettes based upon current 
threats in Europe.  
The results of this research indicate that the CNS-E network is highly 
decentralized and dense. Cooperation is abundant, though not sufficiently strong to 
ensure that information is shared. This research concludes by making the following 
recommendations: 1) The U.S. government should focus on strengthening existing 
relations, not creating new relations; 2) The network should centralize capabilities and 
information in regional hubs; 3) USSOCOM and NSHQ should establish strong 
relationships with law enforcement agencies; 4) USSOCOM and NSHQ can contribute to 
nonproliferation efforts by conducting threat assessments of European chemical 
biological radiological nuclear (CBRN) facilities. 
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The Islamic State (IS)–inspired terror network that carried out the March 2016 
terror attacks in Brussels and the November 2015 attacks in Paris managed to move its 
members to and from Syria, while planning and executing high-visibility attacks, in spite 
of sophisticated Western intelligence.1 Equally disturbing, evidence has recently emerged 
indicating that the IS cell responsible for the attack had monitored the activity of a senior 
researcher at a Belgian nuclear facility, while other reports suggest that IS may have 
interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) material in Iraq and Syria.2 
The Islamic State’s apparent interest in WMD terrorism is problematic for Europeans due 
to Europe being the target of recent attacks, the freedom of movement for individuals 
within the European Union’s Schengen Area, and the massive flow of migrants from the 
Middle East to Europe.3 U.S. President Barack Obama has called the possibility of 
nuclear terrorism “the single biggest threat to U.S. security,” while the need to keep the 
“worst weapons out of the hands of the worst people” is embraced by virtually all 
Western political leaders.4 Although IS is not known to have acquired or employed 
WMDs, the Islamic State’s ability to plan and resource sophisticated terror attacks in 
Europe demonstrates the asymmetric advantage of terror networks over traditional 
                                                 
1 Alicia Parlapiano et al., “The Expanding Web of Connections among the Paris Attackers,” New York 
Times, March 18, 2015, accessed April 25, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/11/15/world/europe/manhunt-for-paris-attackers.html?_r=2. 
2 Patrick Malone and R. Jeffrey Smith, “The Islamic State’s Plot to Build a Radioactive ‘Dirty 
Bomb,’” Foreign Policy, February 29, 2016, accessed March 14, 2016, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/29/the-islamic-states-plot-to-build-a-radioactive-dirty-
bomb/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=e-
mail&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2AEditors%20Picks; Ahmed Rasheed, Aref 
Mohammed, and Stephen Kalin, “Exclusive: Radioactive Material Stolen in Iraq Raises Security 
Concerns,” Reuters, February 17, 2016, accessed March 14, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
mideast-crisis-iraq-radiation-idUSKCN0VQ22F.  
3 Keturah Hetrick, “How Bad Would a Radiological Terror Attack Be?” Defense One, April 1, 2016, 
accessed April 30, 2016, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2016/04/how-bad-would-radiological-terror-
attack-be/127188/. 
4 Ashton Carter, “How to Counter WMD,” Foreign Affairs 83, no. 5 (Sept.–Oct., 2004): 72–13; Alex 
Spillius, “Nuclear Terrorism Is Gravest Threat to Global Security, Barack Obama Warns,” Telegraph, April 




intelligence, counterterrorism (CT), and counterproliferation (CP) organizations. This 
paper, therefore, examines both obstacles to and opportunities for enhanced CP 
collaboration and cooperation in Europe. 
A. THE THREAT 
The modern information age has enabled both the growth of terror networks and 
increased access to WMD material. This potentially catastrophic nexus was partially 
achieved by the A. Q. Khan network, which enabled Pakistan to gain nuclear weapons.5 
Historically, the few instances of WMD terrorism have been due not to a lack of interest 
on behalf of terrorists but to the sophisticated technology required to produce such 
weapons.6 The threshold to begin proliferation may be lowering, however, due to the 
prevalence of nuclear, biological, and chemical dual-use technologies, as well as other 
emerging technologies such as additive manufacturing.7 Additionally, the numerous 
means of sharing information in the modern era raise concerns over the ease with which 
one can transfer intellectual property related to WMD technology. Cumulatively, these 
changes mean that the traditional pathways to proliferation may now be achieved in 
fewer steps. Rather than needing to compile several sensitive components that historically 
only a state could produce, a rogue actor in the near future may acquire the technology 
and expertise needed to assemble WMDs anywhere in the world. 
B. PURPOSE / OUTLINE 
To prevent the proliferation of WMDs among terror networks, the international 
CP community must behave more like a network. The United States’ 2015 National 
Military Strategy (NMS) directs that the United States must “team with multinational and 
                                                 
5 William Langewiesche, “The Wrath of Khan,” Atlantic, November 2005, accessed March 15, 2016, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/the-wrath-of-khan/304333/. 
6 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Al-Qaeda’s Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Policy, 
January 25, 2010, accessed March 14, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/01/25/al-qaedas-pursuit-of-
weapons-of-mass-destruction/. 
7 “What Is Additive Manufacturing?” Wohlers Associates, 2010, accessed April 30, 2016, 
https://www.wohlersassociates.com/additive-manufacturing.html; Jennifer Snow, “Entering the Matrix: 
The Challenge of Regulating Radical Leveling Technologies” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2015). 
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U.S. interagency partners to locate, track, interdict, and secure or destroy WMD, its 
components, and the means and facilities needed to make it, wherever possible.”8 The 
United States and its allies must therefore form the critical core of a CP network, with 
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 
private-sector businesses contributing. Because networked organizations perform better 
than hierarchies in complex environments, we proceed by examining the modern 
environment and the difference between networks and hierarchies.9 Next, we look at the 
use of networks by terror organizations, as well as efforts by the CT community to 
behave more like a network post-9/11. We then examine the relationship between the CT 
and CP communities and recent efforts to foster collaboration between U.S. CP 
organizations. The implications of U.S.–centric CP studies form the basis of our analysis 
of the international CP community. Rather than waiting for terrorists to employ WMDs 
before overhauling the CP enterprise, this paper examines the potential for enhancing the 
international CP network now. 
C. MATCHING ENVIRONMENTS TO ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES: 
NETWORKS VERSUS HIERARCHIES 
The modern information age and associated globalization have led to a rise in 
complexity for organizations.10 The difference between complicated and complex 
environments may appear trivial; however, the distinction is significant for modern 
organizations. Building an automobile is a complicated process involving numerous 
specialized steps. Once the model is created, though, it is relatively easy to replicate. 
Complexity, on the other hand, deals with varied relationships and interactions between 
many entities, meaning that blueprints or models cannot be used. In complex 
                                                 
8 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 
2015, Washington D.C., 2015. 
9 Richard Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and Design (Mason, OH: South-Western/Thomson 
Learning, 2003); Stanley McCrystal, Team of Teams (New York: Penguin, 2015). General McCrystal 
discusses complexity, networks, and hierarchies in detail. His argument is that the best organizational 
constructs are dependent upon their environments. 
10 Moises Naim, The End of Power (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 2, 54–64. Naim argues that 
traditionally powerful organizations and individuals are losing their control of power because it is now easy 
to attain, difficult to use, and easy to lose (2). He cites three revolutions that are enabling this change: the 
more, mobility, and mentality revolutions (54–64).  
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environments, like the weather or the stock market, numerous seemingly insignificant 
actions can collectively have profound effects.11 Complex environments require 
organizations to adjust rapidly, causing leaders to delegate decision making to lower 
levels. As a result, many modern organizations are decentralizing operations in order to 
deal with international markets, rapid innovation, and lightning-fast communications. 
The networks emerging in the information age share certain characteristics that 
distinguish them from traditional organizations. Modern terror networks can be described 
as having three characteristics: unspecified and situation-specific communication and 
coordination systems, linkages between individuals within the network and outside 
organizations, and relationships that are based on shared values rather than hierarchic 
authority.12 In the study of organizational design, the concept of a network is associated 
with what Henry Mintzberg calls an adhocracy. Adhocracies emphasize direct interaction 
between highly autonomous and specialized nodes, enabling mutual adjustment between 
individuals and groups.13 As all this suggests, modern networks operate in decentralized 
and flexible manners, without the need for strict organization or state sponsorship. This 
lack of rigid structure enables collaboration, innovation, and rapid change, making 
networks ideally suited for complex and dynamic environments. 
Modern hierarchical organizations came to prominence in the early 20th century 
as specialization of labor enabled cheaper manufacturing due to the reduction in 
transaction costs associated with a shift from decentralized to centralized manufacturing 
and operations. In the private sector, the work of visionaries like Frederick Winslow 
Taylor demonstrated that large centralized organizations could standardize work, skills, 
and outputs through reductionist processes in order to refine the execution of tasks, thus 
creating great efficiency.14 In the public sector, the needs of modern warfare demanded 
                                                 
11 McChrystal, Team of Teams. See Chapter 3 for more detail on the differences between complex and 
complicated environments. 
12 Michele Zanini and Sean Edwards, “The Networking of Terror in the Information Age,” in 
Networks and Netwars, eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).  
13 Henry Mintzberg, “Organization Design: Fashion or Fit?” Harvard Business Review, January–
February 1981. 10.  
14 Francis Fukuyama, The Great Disruption (New York: Touchstone, 2000), 197, 354; McCrystal, 
Team of Teams, Chapter 2. 
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that nations engage in ever-increasing mobilization, centralization, and application of 
men and material.15 The hierarchical organizations that arose from these shifts are 
typified by a pyramid structure, with a group of leaders on top, several layers of 
managers and support staff in the middle, and an operating core at the bottom. Naturally, 
hierarchies take on varying shapes and sizes depending on their intended outputs and 
outcomes. These include simple structures in the case of small businesses, robust 
operating cores in the case of manufacturing, and large support staffs for professional 
bureaucracies.16 The U.S. interagency structure, primarily built during the Cold War, is 
an iconic example of a group of organizations that are ideally suited for the complicated 
but relatively routine affairs of diplomatic engagement (Department of State), 
intelligence and counterintelligence activities (Central Intelligence Agency and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation), and preparing to fight the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe 
(Department of Defense). The hierarchic organizations that dominate big businesses and 
governments are therefore well suited for certain environments but not for complex tasks 
outside of their traditional areas of responsibility. 
The changes in information management created by the Internet and the 
information age are enabling networks to grow while creating challenges for hierarchic 
organizations. In hierarchic organizations, leaders exercise control based on what Max 
Weber called legal authority, while workers perform tasks for incentives.17 As numerous 
authors have pointed out, emerging networks tend to interact based on shared norms and 
values rather than hierarchical authority or compensation.18 Additionally, hierarchic 
systems perform best when leaders manage limited and compartmentalized information; 
however, the sheer quantity of information flowing in the modern era overwhelms 
                                                 
15 For the case of the U.S., see Sheldon D. Pollack, War, Revenue, and State Building: Financing the 
Development of the American State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
16 Mintzberg, “Fashion or Fit?” 
17 Max Weber, “The Three Types of Legitimate Rule,” in The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization, trans. A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 2009), 324; Robert 
Gibbons, “Incentives in Organizations,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, no. 4 (Fall 1998), 115–17. 
18 Zanini and Edwards, “The Networking of Terror”; Fukuyama, The Great Disruption, 194; Shankar 
Vedantam, “How Terrorist Organizations Work Like Clubs,” Washington Post, August 4, 2008, accessed 
March 14, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/08/03/AR2008080301529.html. 
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organizations, leading to a need for decentralized control. Perhaps the most fundamental 
difference is that hierarchies place primacy on efficiency, while networks enable 
effectiveness. Describing the difference between efficiency and effectiveness in the 
information age, General Stanley McChrystal wrote, “The Task Force had built systems 
that were very good at doing things right, but too inflexible to do the right thing.”19 
Because of this rigidity in hierarchic structures, networks are better suited for complex 
environments where spontaneous reaction is preferable to well-deliberated and rehearsed 
action. Although more power is now being diffused from traditional hierarchic 
organizations to smaller networked organizations, the modern era still requires 
bureaucracies.20 It is how dynamic an organization’s environment is that determines 
which structure is preferable. 
D. TERROR NETWORKS AND THE EVOLUTION OF 
COUNTERTERRORISM 
Increased Internet connectivity in recent years has helped terror networks to grow 
in size, reach, and impact. The earliest terror groups were more hierarchic than the terror 
networks common today. Traditional hierarchies such as the Algerian National Liberation 
Front (FLN) and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) gave way to increasingly 
hybrid groups including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Islamic State, in addition to pure 
networks such as al Qaeda. Al Qaeda, which relies less on hierarchic organization than on 
common ideology, uses Internet connectivity for recruitment, information sharing, and 
operational planning, all of which can now take place in virtual space. Smartphones, with 
their various means of communication, also enable groups to coordinate and synchronize 
activities while remaining physically autonomous from one another. These organizations 
can then “swarm” and rapidly dissipate, rather than mobilizing and operating in a 
traditional military sense.21  
                                                 
19 McChrystal, Team of Teams, 81. 
20 Naim, End of Power; Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, 2nd ed. (Malden: Blackwell, 2004), 
304. 
21 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited),” in Networks and Netwars, 
eds. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001). 
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No cataclysmic event has forced the CP community to integrate, but the attacks 
on 9/11 did provide the catalyst for a major change in CT organizations. The 9/11 
Commission Report and other studies revealed that the U.S. national security apparatus 
was largely stovepiped, meaning interagency collaboration was rare, and limited in its 
effectiveness to counter terrorist networks. Created during the Cold War, the numerous 
intelligence, law enforcement, and military components were best suited to counter state-
on-state aggression rather than nimble and adaptive networks. Recognizing the 
asymmetry between U.S. CT organizations and terror networks, John Arquilla and David 
Ronfeldt recommended in Networks and Netwars that governments adopt similar 
organizational models to their adversaries’, because “it takes networks to fight 
networks.”22 Because governments often cannot, and should not, completely restructure, 
they instead will have to blend networked processes with existing infrastructure to create 
hybrid approaches.23 
The U.S. government began to realize the need to counter terrorism through more 
networked approaches following the attacks on September 11th, 2001. The 9/11 
Commission Report recommended numerous U.S. national security reforms, including 
the creation of unifying offices and a flattening of the interagency. Many of these 
recommendations were adopted, resulting in the creation of the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the introduction of the director of national intelligence, 
and unifying of CT efforts in a “network-based information-sharing system that 
transcends traditional governmental boundaries.”24 By centralizing CT efforts at the 
NCTC and intelligence activities at the director of national intelligence, the U.S. 
government (USG) attempted to connect and integrate the interagency community under 
joint headquarters. Similar to the Department of Defense’s Goldwater-Nicholas 
legislation in 1986, the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report intended to 
create a joint culture within the intelligence community’s interagency. Many of these 
                                                 
22 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar,” 46. 
23 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “The Advent of Netwar.” 
24 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: M.W. Norton 
& Company, 2004), 400.  
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efforts were geared toward streamlining CT operations by centralizing strategic-level 
collaboration.25  
Special Operations Forces (SOF), who play a pivotal role in CT activities, have 
gone to great lengths to foster collaboration at the strategic and operational levels while 
decentralizing execution at the tactical level. Within the Department of Defense (DoD), 
the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is charged with leading the 
fight against terrorism. SOF, who are uniquely selected, trained, and employed to conduct 
an array of activities, are better suited for precise operations against terror networks than 
large conventional forces.26 With the responsibility of leading U.S. CT efforts, 
USSOCOM and its subordinate commands have implemented measures to act more like 
networks.  
General Stanley McChrystal, as commander of USSOCOM’s elite Joint Special 
Operations Command (JSOC), recognized the inability of hierarchical organizations to 
deal with fluid battlefields and enemy networks. He reorganized and removed layers of 
bureaucracy by flattening JSOC in order to build a team of teams. General McChrystal 
found that his organization was highly specialized—the best in the world—at individual 
tasks. Being the best at individual tasks, however, did not always add up to JSOC’s being 
the most effective overall; and it was not winning the fight against terror networks. 
General McChrystal built a team by forcing independent units to learn the roles, 
responsibilities, and challenges of those in other parts of the organization. By 
understanding the other nodes in the network, mid- and junior-level leaders gained a 
greater sense of purpose and were empowered to take swift and necessary action when 
appropriate. This ability to rapidly employ forces and share intelligence through 
coordinated operations and decentralized control enabled JSOC to operate less like a 
hierarchy and more like a network.27 
                                                 
25 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report. 
26 Steven Bucci, “The Importance of Special Operations Forces Today and Going Forward,” in 2015 
Index of U.S. Military Strength, ed. Dakota Wood (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2015), 47–
14. 
27 McChrystal, Team of Teams. 
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In addition to USG efforts to collaborate and to fight networks with networks, the 
international community has made progress in information sharing and CT cooperation. 
Like the USG, NATO initiated intelligence-sharing reforms following the attacks on 
9/11.28 NATO also established a SOF headquarters (NSHQ) in order to centralize and 
unify SOF development, coordination, and direction. In an effort to develop its Global 
SOF Network, USSOCOM built an international operations center called the J3-
International (J3I) to facilitate collaboration with worldwide partners. Despite efforts by 
the USG and international CT communities to cooperate more effectively, the recent 
attacks in Paris and Brussels reveal that there is still space for improvement.  
E. THE NEED FOR A COUNTERPROLIFERATION NETWORK 
The threat of terrorists employing WMDs demands cooperation between CT and 
CP communities that, despite overlapping objectives, are in many cases very different. 
Originating in the Cold War, nonproliferation treaties were designed to control the spread 
of nuclear weapons among states. After the conclusion of the Cold War and the 
dismantling of the Soviet Union, the focus shifted to CP policies that emphasize 
preventing the spread of nuclear material and technology to rogue states and non-state 
actors.29 Post 9/11, the CP community instituted reforms similar to the CT community’s, 
which included creating the National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC) under the 
director of national intelligence. The nexus of CT and CP challenges was articulated in 
the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism’s Report, World 
at Risk. The report addressed the threats of nuclear and biological terrorism, 
recommending significant reforms and additional oversight from the executive and 
legislative branches of government.30 
                                                 
28 Michael Rühle, “NATO Ten Years After: Learning the Lessons,” NATO Review Magazine, 
accessed April 30, 2016, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2011/11-september/10-years-sept-
11/EN/index.htm. 
29 “U.S. Counterproliferation Policy,” Wilson Center International Security Studies, last modified 
January 27, 2005, accessed March 15, 2016, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/us-counterproliferation-
policy. 
30 Bob Graham et al., World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD 
Proliferation and Terrorism (New York: Vintage Books, 2008). 
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Recent studies examined the U.S. CP community as a network finding that, 
despite the U.S. interagency’s expansive size and reach, the community faces numerous 
obstacles to collaboration.31 These challenges stem from differing perspectives and legal 
authorities, a lack of incentives to cooperate, and differences in organizational culture. 
While the division of legal authorities is necessary to run a large bureaucracy, friction can 
occur when problems spill over into more than one agency’s legal jurisdiction. 
Crosscutting issues such as international terrorism, drug trafficking, and CP are most 
effectively countered through the skillful cooperation of numerous agencies that cannot 
achieve success alone, but together can affect the problem. Unfortunately, the interagency 
lacks a unifying strategy; each agency pursues its own agenda.32 This means challenges 
can arise when one agency lacks authorities but wants to act, and an interagency 
counterpart possesses authorities but lacks incentives to cooperate. Looking at this, it 
becomes clear that the interagency needs a change of system—agencies must begin to 
collaborate in advance of a crisis in order to enable cooperation at a critical moment. In 
other words, they must get in the habit of operating as a network. 
Previous research into enhancing collaboration among the U.S. CP community 
found that informal relationships existed across the interagency but formal hierarchical 
relationships prevailed during crises. The findings of this work recommended 
“formalizing the informal” interorganizational relationships that enable the interagency to 
behave more like a network than a bureaucratic hierarchy. In order to counter 
organizational culture that is resistant to collaboration, this research found that the best 
method for collaboration pre-crisis was to create communities of practice that utilize both 
academic environments and virtual space for collaboration and information sharing.33 
If we apply the findings from the U.S. interagency study to the international CP 
community, we find that the international community is far more complex. Rather than 
                                                 
31 Derek Lothringer et al., “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Preliminary Field Study in 
Improving Collaboration” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016). 
32 Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Strategies, 
Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing, United States Government Accountability Office, 
September 2009. 
33 William Cunningham et al., “Too Big to Fail: The U.S. Government Counter Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Enterprise” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014). 
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dealing with one interagency community that resists collaboration, in NATO we find 
27 additional interagency communities. Furthermore, numerous intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) must be considered, including NATO itself, the EU, and the EU’s 
law enforcement agency, Europol. In order to consider the international CP community as 
a network, we must recognize that relationships exist between states, between states and 
IGOs, and IGO to IGO. Our research aims to better understand these relationships by 
examining the existing counter nuclear smuggling network in Europe. Over the course of 
our research, we attempted to address the questions that follow. 
F. RESEARCH PLAN 
Our research question was: what are the obstacles to cooperation and 
collaboration in the execution of counter nuclear smuggling efforts in Europe, and how 
can the established system be improved or better utilized to address the current threats? 
Additionally, this work aimed to address the following questions through 
empirical research: 
1. Who are the members of the counter nuclear smuggling network in 
Europe? 
2. What are the characteristics of the Counter Nuclear Smuggling–Europe 
(CNS-E) network, and which members are most significant? 
Through analysis of the CNS-E network, we attempted to answer the following 
questions:  
3. Where do opportunities exist to enhance CP cooperation/collaboration?  
4. What are the characteristics or attributes of successful 
cooperation/collaboration? 
5.  What is or should be the role of USSOCOM and NSHQ in networking the 
CNS-E? 
We proceed by reviewing literature related to international collaboration. This 
includes a review of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, as well as models of state 
behavior. Next, we provide a framework for our data collection and analysis. We provide 
information on Social Network Analysis (SNA), our data pool, how it was collected, and 
the attributes utilized to build our network. The third step involves depicting and 
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describing the network. We highlight significant findings and observations. These 
findings enable us to draw conclusions and recommendations for USSOCOM, NSHQ, 
and policy makers in general. The conclusions from our research serve to further 
understanding of the CP network in Europe and the potentials to enhance this network. 
Although the products of SNA are not generalizable to other networks, our conclusions 




II. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Deeper analysis of the CP efforts in Europe requires preliminary answers to two 
big questions. First, what is the inherent difference between cooperation in the 
international environment and within a state? Second, what are the main domestic 
influencers that can impact international cooperation? To describe the international 
environment, we explore several prominent international-relations schools of thought: 
realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism. Recognizing that international 
relations is influenced by domestic actors, the second half of this chapter will identify 
theories that explore how leaders and government institutions make decisions and how 
those decision impact international cooperation. The theoretical foundation will provide 
tools with which to analyze counter nuclear smuggling in Europe, explaining the complex 
international environment and allowing better understanding of international CP efforts.  
This theoretical foundation will apply to three main areas of our research. First, 
the theory informs our bounding of the current network and how we quantified the 
relationships. Second, the theory provides different lenses with which to interpret the 
outcomes of our research. Finally, the presented theoretical arguments assist in 
generalizing the CP findings to the broader international security environment. 
B. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY 
The international environment differs from a state’s due largely to the idea of 
ultimate state sovereignty, which leads to anarchy in the international arena. As Kenneth 
Waltz describes it, “domestic systems are centralized and hierarchic” while “international 
systems are decentralized and anarchic.”34 Anarchy typically is defined in international 
relations as the absence of a higher authority to act as a third party to regulate activity.35 
This creates a situation where states can keep their true intentions private, leading to 
                                                 
34 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill Inc., 1979): 88. 
35 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization, 49, no. 3 
(Summer 1995): 381. 
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difficulty communicating true intent and incentivizing active misrepresentation of that 
intent, which ultimately cause commitment problems between states.36 The international 
relations theories of realism, neoliberal institutionalism, and constructivism view the 
international environment differently and compete with one another to some degree; 
while they all generally agree that the international system is anarchic, providing 
challenges to cooperation, the theories disagree on the significance of anarchy to 
cooperation in the long term. Each of the theories provides a different lens with which to 
analyze CNS-E. Realism argues that international cooperation is threat based; neoliberal 
institutionalism contends that cooperation is utilitarian and cost effective to states; and 
constructivism claims that norms of cooperative behavior can be developed over time. 
1. The Realist Outlook on International Cooperation 
Having its root in one of the oldest accepted theories of international relations, 
going back to Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes, and Hans Morgenthau, realism has the most 
negative view of the potential for extended cooperation. Beyond assuming that the 
international system is anarchic, realism assumes anarchy gives reason for states to fear 
each other’s efforts to secure their self-interests.37 State survival is “the most basic 
motive driving states,” and states make rational decisions that seek to maximize their 
outcomes.38 States are therefore unable to fully trust any other state, since current friends 
will become tomorrow’s enemies. This unavoidable “security dilemma,” a term of art 
meaning that the actions one takes to improve defenses appear as threatening to others, is 
a central tenet of realist thought. The centrality of the security dilemma affects the desire 
and ability of states to cooperate in security matters, especially over long durations. John 
Mearsheimer argues that states do cooperate, but alliances are problematic to establish 
and maintain over any length of time because competing state interests eventually lead to 
policy differences.39  
                                                 
36 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.” 
37 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
Alfred A Knopf Inc., 1973). 
38 J. J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 
(1994): 10.  
39 Ibid., 12.  
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From the realist perspective, cooperation is a temporary phenomenon that is 
possible only to address a shared threat; once the threat is removed, state self-interest will 
preclude engaging in alliances. The continued adherence to nuclear treaty obligations 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union is a challenge to typical realist arguments. 
However, the self-interested actions of Russia in 2014 and the ongoing debate about the 
United Kingdom’s participation in the EU indicate that state self-interest continues to 
play a role in European international engagements, especially as the balance of power 
seems to be shifting away from a unipolar system. 
2. Neoliberal Institutionalism: A More Optimistic View 
Another major theory in international relations is neoliberal institutionalism. 
Neoliberals have a positive view of the potential for cooperation, basing their arguments 
on the writings of Enlightenment thinkers in the tradition of Rousseau and John Lock and 
classic liberal economic theorists such as Adam Smith. Neoliberal institutionalists 
assume states make rational choices and believe those choices lead states to “[abandon] 
independent decision making in favor of joint decision making.”40 This capacity for 
overcoming pure self-interest in favor of community good leads to a belief in commonly 
held norms and institutions and therefore in the efficacy of international regimes in 
shaping state behavior. Neoliberal institutionalists believe that international institutions 
perform three main functions that increase the likelihood of international cooperation: 
changing the payoff structure to increase mutual interest, increasing the time horizon of 
interactions, and mitigating the problem of free riders as the number of parties 
increases.41 Thus, cooperation builds on itself and lessens the risks of collective action.42  
 
                                                 
40 Arthur A. Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in International 
Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 132. 
41 Kenneth A. Oye, Cooperation under Anarchy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
42 For a more in-depth discussion, see Keohane and Martin (1995); Krasner (1983). 
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3. Constructivism: Building Cooperative Potential 
Constructivism takes a middle view on cooperation in the international 
environment, arguing that commonly held norms of society can impact the acceptance of 
international cooperation, especially over time. World order, constructivists contend, is a 
work in progress determined by historic patterns that shape a state’s image of itself and 
others, and it can therefore be reimagined as norms change. This argument allows states 
to become less self-interested and more cooperative based on the establishment of shared 
norms over time. Domestic social norms also add complexity to the system by 
determining the limits of acceptable behavior in bargaining—domestic norms impact a 
state’s behavior in the international environment.43 All this makes anarchy a secondary 
consideration; Alexander Wendt argues that “anarchy is what states make of it.”44 Social 
structure, not anarchy, is the primary factor that determines the level of cooperation or 
conflict within the international system: an “anarchy of friends differs from one of 
enemies.”45 
Constructivism can help explain the change in cooperative potential of the 
international environment over time, both positive and negative. Soon after the 
development of nuclear weapons, Europe developed a shared belief in collective security 
as the way to prevent another world war. Constructivism would contend that the shift in 
the social structure established an environment of cooperation, not self-interest; the social 
structure of perceived friends enabled the development of the European Union, its 
affiliated institutions, and the CP treaties and regulatory institutions. Conversely, change 
in the social structure also has the potential to shift away from cooperation as states see 
others as threats. The level of internalization of cooperative norms could explain the 
varying views of the current world order, for example Russia acting in its perceived self-
interest while Germany continues to act cooperatively. 
                                                 
43 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Malden: Polity Press, 2004), 69–70. For additional information 
on domestic social norms, see Katzenstein (1996); Gray (1999). 
44 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 
1995): 77. 
45 Ibid., 77–78. For a more in-depth discussion, see Wendt (1994); Wendt (1995); Adler (1997); 
Copeland (2000). 
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C. DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
In the interconnected environment of the 21st century, states are not unitary 
entities interacting at a single point of contact. There are a number of influencers within 
each state that can impact cooperation in the international arena. Collectively, these 
cooperation nodes create an interconnected web of communication between and among 
states. Relevant to CP efforts are two domestic players that influence a state’s 
international cooperation: leaders and government institutions.46 The different domestic 
influences that have bearing on international cooperation must be taken into account by 
those attempting cooperative CP endeavors. Domestic actors can trigger internal 
pressures, making cooperation much more difficult.  
1. Leaders: Cognitive Limitations to Rational Decision Making 
Leaders of states have an obvious impact on the trajectory of the states they 
represent, so it is important to recognize the cognitive limits of state leaders and how they 
impact leaders’ willingness to cooperate in CP efforts. Historically, the rational actor 
model (RAM) has been used to explain and predict how individuals and states act in their 
own self-interest with consistent and stable preference orderings to determine optimal 
outcomes based on available options.47 Bounded rationality, however, recognizes that 
individuals are not able to identify and process all of the applicable data to make fully 
rational decisions. Research in bounded rationality asserts that leaders rarely have 
complete or certain information, and even if they do, they are unable to process the 
amount of information that leads not to optimal solutions but to satisfactory ones.48 
Prospect theory contends that states that are happy with the status quo, known as 
being in a gains frame, are generally risk adverse, while states that are unhappy with the 
                                                 
46 Austin Long, Deterrence from Cold War to Long War: Lessons from Six Decades of RAND 
Research (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), 57–58. 
47 Herbert A. Simon, “Rationality in Political Behavior,” Political Psychology 16, no. 1 (March 1995): 
48. 
48 Herbert A. Simon, “Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science,” 
American Political Science Review 79, no. 2 (June 1985). 
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status quo, known as being in a losses frame, will be more risk acceptant.49 The leaders in 
Europe tend to be content with the status quo and therefore are unlikely to risk 
participation in proliferation activities. Analyzing leaders’ frames of mind could help 
explain the variation in behaviors toward the established CP institutions. Leaders that are 
unhappy with the status quo and not seeing the benefits of adhering to the CP norms of 
behavior may be more risk acceptant and risk proliferating nuclear programs, as was the 
case with Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein.  
2. Government Institutions: Structural Impacts on Cooperation 
Because of the complexity of an interconnected international environment, 
implementing proposed international-cooperation efforts requires interaction beyond 
individual leaders. Broader government institutions affect the international arena, both 
directly and indirectly. There are many theoretical approaches that seek to describe the 
effects of these organizational decision-making processes on cooperation. We will 
discuss three that each provide a different way to understand the network of international 
relationships in Europe: the organizational behavior model, the bureaucratic politics 
model, and new institutional economics theory. 
Organizational behavior models describe the state itself as a complex organization 
that produces outputs, rather than clear choices as the RAM suggests. Organizational 
models suggest that the head of state alone does not make decisions; instead, a robust 
structure of specialized organizations contributes to the leader’s understanding and 
decision making. Organizational models emphasize that numerous factors, including 
structure, technology, culture, and the environment, all influence an organization’s 
output.50 The combined effect of these factors can result in outcomes that differ from the 
leaders’ and decision makers’ original intent.51 One can look at CP efforts in Europe as a 
system through this model and determine if the structure fits the environment. By 
                                                 
49 Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 2 
(March, 2002): 170–171. For further discussion of prospect theory, see Kahneman and Tversky (1979); 
Tetlock and Mellers (2002); Berejikian (2002). 
50 Mintzberg, “Fashion or Fit?” 
51 For additional information, see Allison and Zelikow (1999); Mintzberg (1981); Sathe (1983); 
Robbins and Judge (2013). 
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analyzing the organizational structure, technology, culture, inputs, and outputs the model 
provides a way to judge effectiveness of the CP system in Europe.  
The bureaucratic politics model emphasizes the competing motives of 
organizations, or bargaining games, rather than the outputs of organizational behavior. 
The bureaucratic politics model assumes that each suborganization within a state 
government has its own self-interests which affect how the suborganization thinks and 
acts.52 Viewing the state as an organization with limited resources, suborganization 
leaders must consider how their actions affect national, organizational, and personal 
goals.53 Foreign policy, therefore, is often the result of personal bargaining and 
compromising rather than rational debate.54 This model is useful when analyzing the 
complex domestic stakeholder struggles that take place when seeking to execute 
international CP initiatives. When Germany engages with Poland on instituting CP 
policy, they have both internal stakeholders that will complicate their ability to cooperate; 
understanding who the powerful stakeholders are and how they impact decision making 
can be helpful when bargaining in the international arena. 
New institutional economics (NIE) is a broad theory that argues that economic 
and political institutions mutually impact each other and must be studied together to 
conduct comparative polity analyses.55 Democratic peace theory, one subset of NIE, 
contends that higher political and economic freedom reduces potential conflict between 
states of similar structure.56 Selectorate theory, another subset of NIE, postulates that 
state leaders’ decisions are determined not by the best interest of the state but by a desire 
                                                 
52 Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy 
Implications,” World Politics 24 (Spring 1972). 
53 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis 
(New York: Longman, 1999), 255. 
54 For additional information, see Kant (2006); Allison and Zelikow (1999); Allison and Halperin 
(1972). 
55 Oliver E. Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead,” Journal 
of Economic Literature 38, no. 3 (September 2000); Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek, introduction to 
Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions, eds. Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric A. Hanushek (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
56 Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976,” Journal 
of Conflict Resolution 33, no. 1 (March 1989). 
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to remain in power;57 therefore, the structure of the government, whether democratic or 
autocratic, affects cooperation potential.58 Audience cost, too, can play a role in 
predicting state cooperation, democratically elected leaders find it easier to signal private 
intentions and commit to a course of action, since the electorate will punish them in the 
future for not following through on commitments. Authoritarian leaders, conversely, 
suffer more limited audience cost by not adhering to commitments, which leads 
authoritarian leaders to be less credible in international bargaining.59 The various 
elements of NIE theory provide multiple tools with which to analyze the countries in 
Europe. 
Through these different models, it may be possible to determine which countries 
are more likely to cooperate in CP efforts and which to oppose efforts based on the 
structures of their domestic political and economic institutions. Many of the entrance 
requirements of the EU and the North American Treaty Organization (NATO), for 
example, are efforts to democratize the allied states to facilitate future cooperation in CP 
as well as in security and economic initiatives. As the NIE theories indicate, states with 
democratic political policies and liberal economic policies tend to negotiate instead of go 
to war, leaders are held accountable for actions to a broader population, and audience cost 
facilitates communication of truthful intent, all of which facilitates cooperation.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Many different schools of thought can be useful when considering cooperation in 
the international arena. International relations theories provide different ways to view the 
system and to analyze past, present, and future interactions. Looking at the ways in which 
domestic influences impact international relations provides additional tools to understand 
how the interconnected nature of the current system impacts cooperation. The realities of 
Europe in the early 21st century seem to exhibit evidence of many of the schools of 
                                                 
57 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Domestic Politics and International Relations,” International Studies 
Quarterly 46, no. 1 (March 2002): 4. 
58 For a more in-depth discussion of selectorate theory, see Morrow et al. (2008); Bueno de Mesquita 
and Smith (2011). 
59 James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” 
American Political Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 587. 
 21
thought. Self-interests, international institutions, established norms of international 
behavior, leadership personalities, and differing bureaucratic politics combine to create a 
complex environment.  
Our research will utilize these analytical tools as we seek to describe the 
international CP environment in Europe. The theoretical principles described in this 
chapter are instrumental in informing the bounding of the network as well as in selecting 
and quantifying the relational links within that network. Additionally, the theoretic 
arguments provide different lenses with which to interpret the outcomes of our 
quantitative and qualitative research. Finally, the presented theory will inform the 
generalization of our findings regarding the CNS-E network to the broader international 
security environment. The following chapters will first conduct a quantitative analysis of 
the CNS-E utilizing social network analysis methodologies and then conduct a qualitative 
analysis utilizing counterfactual cases. Both methodologies will be informed by the 











III. THE COUNTER NUCLEAR SMUGGLING–EUROPE: 
NETWORK ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is focused on the social network analysis (SNA) conducted on the 
Counter Nuclear Smuggling–Europe (CNS-E) network. SNA provides a collection of 
methods useful for studying the structure and function of networks. The first section 
discusses how the network was constructed—how the boundaries were defined, what 
relationships were measured, and how data was collected. The second section discusses 
the analysis of the CNS-E network and various subnetworks. The findings indicate the 
CNS-E network can be considered an organic structure, decentralized, relatively 
informal, and highly dense.60 This configuration is generally well suited for the CNS-E 
network’s task and operating environment. While state-bilateral relations account for the 
majority of ties in the network, the graphs and metrics clearly indicate regional IGOs are 
the most effective institutions for facilitating strong relationships. 
B. SECTION I: CONSTRUCTING THE NETWORK 
1. Bounding 
The first challenge in defining a network is establishing its boundaries. The realist 
and nominalist strategies are two methods of deciding who fits within a network. The 
realist strategy allows actors within the network to identify others members and is a more 
subjective approach. The nominalist strategy allows the researcher to bound the network 
according to the requirements of the research.61 We used a combination of the two 
strategies to build the CNS-E network. 
Starting with a nominalist strategy, we narrowed the scope of the network to fit 
the research question regarding counter nuclear smuggling in Europe. Consequently, we 
                                                 
60 Steven McShane and Mary Von Glinow, Organizational Behavior (McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 
2012), 238.  
61 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, vol. 34 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 
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started with a geographic and functional boundary. From this point, we considered which 
type of actors or stakeholders had the most immediate impact on the issue of counter 
smuggling, including states, IGOs, and substate agencies. All European states were 
included, less the microstates, as they are the primary stakeholders in the network. The 
U.S. was included because the research is primarily intended to support U.S. 
countersmuggling efforts. Significant international government, military, and law 
enforcement organizations were included based on perceived influence on the network. 
Regarding the inclusion of U.S. agencies and programs, selection was largely determined 
by drawing from a 2014 congressional report The Evolution of Cooperative Threat 
Reduction: Issues for Congress.62 Other U.S. military and law enforcement nodes were 
included to fit the focus of the research and based on their perceived influence on the 
network.  
From this starting point, we then applied a realist approach (not to be confused 
with international relations realism) to our research by using material provided by actors 
to identify other important actors, such as by looking at an actor’s working agreements or 
strategic partnerships. This led to the inclusion of some actors and validated the presence 
of others. Given the immense potential size of a CP network, we also excluded numerous 
types of actors like universities, corporations, influential individuals, and others whom 
we assessed fell below the threshold of influence for CP decision making and operational 
capability. 
There are three broad types of actors that comprise the CNS-E network; state 





                                                 
62 Mary Beth Nikitin and Amy F. Woolf, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for 
Congress (Congressional Research Service, 2014). 
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Table 1.   CNS-E Network Actors by Type 
States IGOs Sub-State Agencies/ Programs 
Albania Lithuania CIS DHS CSI 
Armenia Luxembourg CTBTO DoD DTRA 
Austria Macedonia EU DoD EUCOM 
Azerbaijan Malta G7 GP DOE GTRI 
Belarus Moldova GICNT DOE GMS  
Belgium Montenegro IAEA DOS EXBS 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Netherlands Interpol DOS NSOI 
Bulgaria Norway NATO EU CBRN COE 
Croatia Poland NSS Europol 
Cyprus Portugal NSG FBI  
Czech Republic Romania OSCE FRONTEX 
Denmark  Russia PSI   
Estonia Serbia SELEC   
Finland Slovakia UNSCR 1540 COM   
France  Slovenia UN    
Georgia Spain ZANCOM   
Germany Sweden     
Greece Switzerland     
Hungary Turkey     
Iceland Ukraine     
Ireland 
United 
Kingdom     
Italy United States     
Latvia       
 
2. Relationships 
Relational data makes up the structure of a network and is considered the most 
important factor in determining behavior.63 There are two distinct sets of relations in the 
                                                 
63 Alexandra Marin and Barry Wellman, “Social Network Analysis: An Introduction,” in Handbook of 
Social Network Analysis, eds. Peter Carrington and John Scott (London: Sage, 2010). 
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CNS-E network. The first set describes bilateral state relations. The second set describes 
non-state bilateral relations and non-state to state relations.  
The bilateral state relationships analyzed in the network were selected using 
elements of national power known as DIME (diplomatic, information, military, 
economic).64 We elected to forgo collecting data specific to the information element due 
to the difficulty quantifying it individually as well as the understanding that information 
plays a role in each of the other elements’ power.65 To keep the data relatively consistent, 
we used common country reports from a single source. The relational data that was 
collected is from a fixed report date and subject to change with the dynamic international 
environment. The existence of the European Union (EU) complicates the quantification 
of bilateral relations within Europe, as it is a non-state actor that has significant influence 
on its member states’ policies and so blurs the categorical distinction. In an effort to take 
the prominence of the organization into account while also recognizing the fact that the 
member states have individual foreign policies, we established a standardized metric to 
judge the cooperative mechanisms in place. Membership in the EU inherently increased 
bilateral relations between member states, especially in the economic realm, but did not 
preclude differentiation in relations between members or with non-members.66 
To measure the diplomatic element, we identified the existence of diplomatic 
engagements, the level of cooperation displayed by heads of state, and the existence of 
diplomatic disagreements. States were assumed to have normal relations with the other 
states unless there was a particular area of conflict or positive relation indicated in the 
report. In measuring the military element of national power, we looked at the level of 
shared military equipment, the presence of foreign forces, the existence of security 
agreements, participation in combined exercises, foreign military or police training 
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Richard Whitman (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).  
 27
programs, and the existence of open military conflict. Given that the modern environment 
requires international cooperation to address shared security risks which are at times 
more appropriate for police forces,67 both military and police foreign engagement were 
considered part of the military element of national power. Economic relations were 
determined based on three main ties: major economic trading partners, the existence of 
free trade agreements, and international sanctions. Relations between all EU members 
were automatically considered strong due to the established free trade agreements, shared 
borders, and other economic incentives in place throughout the EU. 
Each of the elements of national power was scored independently, and an 
aggregate score was then determined to represent the overall relationship between states, 
with equal weight given to each element. The final process in determining the bilateral 
relational scores involved taking the average relation between states, which symmetrized 
the data. This was necessary because the non-state data was symmetrical. In order for 
both sets of data to be combined into a one-mode network all data had to be symmetrical.  
The bilateral non-state and non-state to state relations were selected upon 
observing the type of cooperation necessary for the network to carry out its purpose. 
These include typical functions of international police organizations.68 The relevant types 
of relation are membership/participation, operational cooperation, and information 
sharing. Membership/participation describes a state’s commitment to a non-state actor. 
The level of commitment was measured using two criteria. The first measured a state’s 
status with a non-state actor—a member, observer, or participant. The second focused on 
the strength of relation gained from participation. For instance, a membership in the EU 
was judged to produce a stronger tie than participation in the CTBTO. 
Operational cooperation broadly describes a relationship of partnered activities, 
be they training, support, or partnered operations. It is measured based on the perceived 
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level of cooperation needed to conduct those activities. Examples of operational 
cooperation include training conducted by DOS NSOI, inspections conducted by the 
IAEA, or multilateral peacekeeping operations by the OSCE. This relation seeks to 
differentiate non-state actors that have an operational role from those that solely offer 
best practices. 
Lastly, information sharing describes the sharing of sensitive or operational 
information. This is perhaps the most important relationship for this network to be 
effective. Transnational problems inherently require information sharing across borders. 
The strength of information sharing was measured based on three questions. First, is 
information sharing a primary task of the non-state actor? Second, does the non-state 
actor have information-sharing systems? Third, how effectively is information shared? 
All three relations were graded on the same scale and then aggregated to get an overall 
relationship strength.  
Relational data presented two challenges for building the network, which largely 
stemmed from the different actor types within the network. First, the actors lacked a 
common set of relations. Second, the data collected was a mix of symmetrical and 
asymmetrical. It was necessary to represent multiple actor types in a one mode network 
so that the whole CNS-E network could be analyzed. To overcome the lack of common 
relations, two sets of relations were examined. To ensure equal weighting of the relations, 
the same scale was used for all relations. To overcome the mix of data, all bilateral state 
data were made symmetrical (by averaging) to match the non-sate data.  
3. Data Collection 
Data collection was divided into two efforts and conducted over two months. 
State-to-state relations were gathered almost entirely from IHS Jane’s country reports. A 
score for each node was coded into a 72 x 72 one-mode matrix. Each relation was coded 
on a separate spreadsheet and then aggregated into one matrix. This produced the 
bilateral state relations matrix. Relations between states and non-state actors were 
gathered from a combination of official websites, articles, and government reports. The 
scores were coded for each node in a two-mode matrix. Each relation was coded on a 
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separate spreadsheet and then aggregated. This produced a 27 x 72 two-mode matrix for 
state to non-state relations. The two aggregated matrices were then combined to produce 
the compiled one-mode matrix used for the CNS-E network. 
C. SECTION II: CNS-E ANALYSIS 
1. Analysis Overview 
The analytical framework applied to the CNS-E network evaluates three key 
aspects of a network: content, composition, and structure.69 This framework parts from 
the strict structural analysis common in SNA by also considering other important factors 
like environment and context. The advantage of this approach is a wider accounting of 
factors that influence the network, which leads to a more thorough understanding of the 
network and an increased ability to identify problems and solutions. The content of a 
network includes its purpose and the environment in which it operates. The composition 
includes the actors in it and the relations that make up the ties between those actors.70 
The structure includes a variety of metrics illuminating two key characteristics: density 
and centralization. These structural characteristics largely determine the organizational 
configuration of a network, which determine what it will be good (or bad) at 
accomplishing.  
In addition to the key aspects of the CNS-E network, four subnetworks are 
extracted for analysis. These subnetworks are differentiated by lines of effort (LOE) that 
correspond to the range of CP/NP activities. The LOEs are divided as follows: LOE 1, 
contain nuclear material; LOE 2, prevent transnational shipment of nuclear material; LOE 
3, secure borders; LOE 4, interdict nuclear material. Reducing CP/NP activities into lines 
of effort allows for a more detailed analysis of the whole network. This approach lets us 
identify key actors across the range of CP/NP activities, which actors are involved in 
multiple activities, and the lines of communication necessary to track an incident from 
LOE 1 to LOE 4. 
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2. CNS-E Network 
The CNS-E network comprises 72 nodes including states, substate 
agencies/programs, and international governmental organizations (Figure 1). There are 
two sets of ties in the network. The first set defines state-to-state relationships. The 
second set defines state-to-non-state and non-state-to-non-state relationships. As we have 
discussed, state-to-state ties are aggregated from three relations—diplomatic, economic, 
and military—and state-to-non-state ties are aggregated from three different relations—
membership/participation, operational, and intelligence sharing. All relations are 
weighted the same. The majority of ties between states and non-states is due to 
membership/participation, followed by operational, and finally information sharing. The 
Counter Nuclear Smuggling–Europe network sociogram depicted in Figure 1 shows the 
whole network. The ties represent overall aggregated relationship scores. The nodes are 
colored by type: blue are states, red are IGOs, and black are substate agencies/programs. 
Each node is sized by its overall betweenness; a measure of network centrality that will 
be discussed later in this section. 
 
Figure 1.  The Counter Nuclear Smuggling–Europe Network  
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Analyzing a network’s content is critical to understanding its effectiveness. 
Network configurations are not inherently “good” or “bad,” but have a good or bad fit 
according to their purpose and environment.71 A highly centralized structure may be 
effective for an infantry platoon but completely ineffective for a marketing firm. Looking 
at the CNS-E network, its purpose is to prevent the smuggling of nuclear material with an 
end state of avoiding an unconventional nuclear attack, and it operates in an environment 
that can be characterized as complex, dynamic, and anarchic. 
A complex network has many external variables influencing its outcome,72 and 
the international environment, nuclear security, border security, intelligence, state 
relations, and enemy capabilities are just a few of the variables that influence the CNS-E 
network’s performance. Many of the same variables cause the environment to be 
dynamic; that is, capable of rapid change.73 The international environment, as a variable, 
is itself subject to rapid changes; take, for example, the sudden rise of ISIL in the Levant 
and its destabilizing effects in Syria and Iraq. The diffusion of technology has rapidly 
changed enemy—specifically non-state actors’—capabilities, forcing the CNS-E network 
to adapt. These two examples illustrate a small part of the environment’s dynamism. The 
last characteristic of the CNS-E network’s environment is the inherent anarchy that 
defines international politics.74 There is no higher authority that has control or dictates 
the actions of the network. While some actors are more influential than others, the 
majority of actors in the CNS-E network make their own decisions, driven largely by 
their own interests. This absence of an executive or central authority makes the CNS-E 
network particularly interesting in organizational study, since existing work on CP 
network analysis is situated within a single state’s authority.75 This must be considered 
alongside the network’s purpose and environment when analyzing its structure and 
effectiveness.  
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The structure of the CNS-E network can be characterized as highly dense. Density 
reflects how connected a network is by dividing the actual number of ties by its potential 
number of ties.76 The CNS-E network has a density score of .745, which means three-
quarters of all potential ties are present in the network. This is abnormally high for a 
network of this size, as density tends to be inversely correlated to network size. Visually, 
the CNS-E network sociogram confirms that the network is highly connected; however, 
the connectedness is not evenly dispersed. The state nodes form a dense cluster, 
indicating they have more ties with one another than with non-state nodes. In fact, 
relations between state nodes are pervasive, even between states that are seemingly at 
odds. Density has several influences on a network. The more connected a network is, the 
more likely actors are to conform to norms and appropriate behavior. In part, this is 
because influence and accountability increase with additional ties.77 For the CNS-E 
network, high density should translate into actor compliance with network norms. 
Therefore, the network should generally achieve compliance with widely accepted 
practices on CP/NP issues like nuclear facility security and safety, export control 
measures, and participation in NP/CP IGOs. This may help explain why there is such 
widespread participation in IGOs like the IAEA and treaties like PSI. 
Density bestows two additional traits on networks: diffusion and resilience. 
Generally, a dense network can diffuse things, like information, faster than a sparse 
network.78 Dense networks tend to be more compact, meaning the average distance 
between nodes and distance from one side of the network to the other (diameter) is 
shorter than in sparse networks. The ability for information to travel from one node to 
any other node in the CNS-E network within a few walks should significantly increase 
the network’s effectiveness. A high degree of connectedness also increases a network’s 
resiliency, because of the presence of multiple pathways between nodes.79 In other words, 
removing one node will not fragment the network or stop transmission to any other node. 
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This is a tremendous benefit for the CNS-E network, as information sharing is a critical 
task. If the United Kingdom needs to pass sensitive information to Bulgaria, it can expect 
to have reliable communication through one of many paths. If bilateral relations are not 
strong enough, the UK can pass information through the EU, Europol, Frontex, NATO, 
or the OSCE.  
The structure of the CNS-E network can also be characterized as decentralized. 
Centralization describes the power or influence distribution throughout a network.80 
Highly centralized networks concentrate power in one or several nodes. In contrast, 
decentralized networks disperse power throughout numerous actors. While there are 
actors in the CNS-E network that have more power and influence than others, most nodes 
retain a significant degree of power. This makes sense given that most nodes are 
sovereign states or IGOs that do not answer to a higher authority. Similar to actor 
centrality, centralization can be measured with different metrics depending on what 
constitutes power in a particular network.81 In the CNS-E network, centralization is 
measured by degree and betweenness.  
Degree centralization considers the number of ties an actor has as a reflection of 
power. The logic follows that the actor with the most ties has the most opportunity and is 
the least constrained.82 In other words, more ties equal more channels of transmission. In 
the CNS-E network, nodes like the U.S. and Germany will likely have more power in the 
network because they have more connections than nodes like Belarus. The network level 
score is a percentage of degree inequality compared to the theoretical maximum of a 
perfectly centralized star network.83 The CNS-E network has a degree centralization 
score of 21.93%. Roughly, this means power by degree is one-fifth as concentrated as it 
is in a star network. However, another metric indicates the network is more decentralized 
than this score may suggest. There is a significant range of degree centrality scores 
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between the nodes, with CIS having 10 ties and the United States having 68 ties. This 
range increases the variance, moving it closer to the idealized network.  
Betweenness centrality considers an actor in a position of brokerage, meaning that 
actor connects two nodes by the shortest path (geodesic), as having power.84 Brokers 
control the flow of whatever the network is transmitting, be it friendship or information, 
and pass it to otherwise isolated nodes. The more isolated a node, the more power a 
broker has. Betweenness centralization is calculated by looking at how many geodesic 
paths between all node pairs travel through a given node. The network score is again 
given as a percentage of the theoretical maximum for a star network of the same size.85 
The CNS-E network shows a tiny .86% betweenness centralization score, indicating 
extreme decentralization. This makes sense given the mean ties per node is 52.8 out of a 
possible 71. So the average node is connected to three-quarters of the network without an 
intermediary.  
This highly decentralized type of network is called a flat organization or 
heterarchy.86 While many heterarchies still have authority figures, there is no central 
authority in the CNS-E network. The structure of the CNS-E network has many 
implications for its function, including several major advantages. The foremost advantage 
for the CNS-E network is the capacity to share information. Knowledge can originate in 
any part of the network and flow in multiple directions to rest of the network.87 
Considering the CNS-E network’s environment, this capacity for timely transmission is 
crucial to effectively counter smuggling. For instance, Frontex can simultaneously notify 
multiple actors across the network if they discover ongoing smuggling, instead of 
reporting up a chain of command and waiting for the information to flow back down to 
relevant actors. In a highly centralized hierarchy, information tends to travel vertically, 
making information sharing through the network slow. This type of communication 
would not be effective for the CNS-E network.  
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Another advantage of decentralized systems is flexibility to deal with complex 
environments.88 As we have discussed, complex environments are characterized by how 
many variables affect the outcomes of the network. In this type of environment, there are 
too many critical factors for any one authority to control. Decentralized networks, by 
widely distributing power, allow critical issues to be addressed by the actors most 
affected by a particular variable. Highly decentralized networks also tend to have less 
formalized rules and procedures. This is certainly true for the CNS-E network. The 
upside of decentralized, less formalized networks, also called organic structures, is 
adaptability.89 Organic structures quickly adapt to changing environments precisely 
because they lack formalized rules on how they must deal with problems. State actors in 
the CNS-E network do not follow a set of international standard operating procedures 
when they are confronted by nuclear smuggling. States can adapt to threats however they 
deem necessary. This benefits the network in that a central node does not have to assess 
each actor’s unique vulnerabilities and issue SOPs for how to deal with them. This would 
be not only inefficient but ineffective as well.  
Microlevel analysis of the CNS-E network struggles to reveal much useful 
information about the power of individual actors. The density and decentralization of the 
network mean there are many well-connected actors and power is distributed among 
them. The most distinctive centrality measure, though, is betweenness. The United States 
has the highest (normalized) betweenness centrality score, 1.215 compared with a mean 
score of .366. However, the inclusion of numerous U.S. agencies makes this a U.S.-
centric CP network, contributing to its central position. It may be more enlightening to 
look at the next most central actors, which are France (1.006), the United Kingdom 
(.909), and Ukraine (.895). Though these are very low centralization scores, they are 
significantly higher than the mean. Consequently, these actors are in the best positions of 
brokerage, meaning they have the greatest capacity to influence the network. 
A more useful microlevel analysis can be gained by looking at the strongest 
relations in the network (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2.  Strong Ties Sub-Network 
To get a better microanalysis of actors, a subnetwork representing ties with a 
aggregate score greater than five (of a possible six) was extracted from the larger 
network; actors without strong ties were not included. We call this the strong ties 
subnetwork. Similar to the CNS-E network sociogram, the ties represent an aggregate 
relationship strength of three separate relations. The nodes are colored the same way 
(blue are states, red are IGOs, and black are substate agencies/programs) and are sized by 
betweenness centrality. The premise of this subnetwork is that cooperation in sensitive 
situations may only happen between actors with the strongest ties.90 This network has 
significantly fewer actors and connections. This smaller, less dense network offers more 
useful analysis of key actors and relations, and looking at it reveals interesting ties 
between nodes. SELEC is a regional organization in a strong position of brokerage with 
Southeast European states. In theory, establishing strong relations with SELEC should 
increase cooperation with its member states. Perhaps more interesting is the brokerage 
position of the Department of Energy’s Global Nuclear Security node. It connects the 
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United States to Russia, suggesting the strongest cooperation between the two countries 
is conducted through the Department of Energy. A further implication is that Russia is in 
a brokerage position between the DOE node and Belarus and Armenia. Thus, if the DOE 
needed a path to Armenia or Belarus, Russia is in a position to broker a relationship.  
Three non-state actors occupy the center of the network: Frontex, Europol, and 
NATO. The quantitative metrics support the visual analysis both in degree and 
betweenness centrality. Frontex and Europol are tied for the highest degree centrality 
score of 29, and NATO is at 27. These are significantly higher than the mean ties per 
node at 6.21 (without isolates) and the median of 5. For betweenness centrality, NATO 
has the highest score with a normalized betweenness of 16.284, compared with Frontex at 
9.3 and Europol with 9.24. For state nodes, Germany has the highest degree centrality 
with a score of 16. The United States has the highest betweenness centrality score of 
8.535, despite having a low degree of 4. This can be explained by the unique broker 
position the U.S. occupies, connecting several peripheral nodes to the rest of the network. 
This positional advantage gives the United States’ moderate influence in the network. 
3. Line of Effort Sub-Networks 
The following subnetworks were extracted from the larger CNS-E network by 
reducing the mission of countersmuggling into four LOEs. The LOEs reflect the range of 
CP/NP activities conducted by the network that contribute to countersmuggling and can 
be seen as linear in nature (though they do not have to be). The purpose of the LOEs is to 
examine the various stages of nuclear countersmuggling in greater detail and specifically 
to identify key non-state actors in each network. For this reason, states have not been 
included in the subnetworks. Including the states would fail to render a clear picture of 
important non-state actors, and states’ significance can be assumed across the LOEs. 
Two considerations must be remembered for this analysis. First, the influence of 
each node is based only upon its relations with other non-state actors. Thus, a node with 
many state ties, like OSCE, may appear less important here than nodes with few state 
ties, like the FBI. If influence needs to pass beyond the LOE subnetworks to states, it is 
then important to look at who has many or strong state ties. The second consideration is 
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that each node uniquely contributes to the network. This requires a qualitative 
understanding of how each node contributes to fully appreciate the analysis. For example, 
UNSC 1540 is influential in LOE 2, but that does not mean they are the node most 
capable of detecting shipping containers smuggling nuclear material. 
In all of the following sociograms, the ties are aggregate relationship scores, red 
nodes are IGOs, black nodes are substate agencies/programs, and all nodes are sized by 
betweenness centrality. 
4. LOE 1 Contain Nuclear Material 
The purpose of LOE 1 is to contain nuclear material. This includes a variety of 
actions and agreements focused on reducing and safeguarding nuclear material both for 
military and civilian purposes. The military side of nuclear material containment can 
present challenges, as states are wary of agreeing to safeguards or inspections of nuclear 
materials. The sites housing weapons or the nuclear programs may be sensitive to 
national security, and the safeguards are expensive to implement.91 On the civilian side, 
one challenge is the wide use of equipment containing nuclear material in unguarded 
locations. One estimate suggests there are over 13,000 buildings in over 100 countries 
that contain radiological sources large enough to make an effective dirty bomb.92 
Understanding the breadth of the problem LOE 1 seeks to address gives context to the 
make-up of the subnetwork. Each node in the subnetwork uniquely contributes to the 
mission of LOE 1 (Figure 3). However, the contributions can be generalized as one of the 
following: best practices for safeguarding or reducing nuclear material, inspection of sites 
containing nuclear material, or support to safeguards or reduction of nuclear material.  
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Figure 3.  LOE 1 Sociogram 
Visual analysis of LOE 1 shows a compact network with a few central actors. The 
subnetwork is moderately dense, with one-third of all possible connections present. PSI is 
isolated because it is an initiative to strengthen pre-existing laws which states commit to; 
it does not apply to non-states. The average path length between nodes is 1.658, and the 
diameter is 3. The compactness of the network along with its density can be interpreted as 
a moderate degree of cooperation in the LOE 1 subnetwork. With regards to central 
actors, it is important to note that centrality does not indicate what the node contributes to 
the network, only that it is central. For instance, the EU has the highest betweenness 
centrality score of 28.55 and a degree of 12. In terms of position in the network, the EU is 
the most central actor, which indicates a high degree of influence. However, their role is 
fairly limited to supporting best practices for CP/NP. On the other hand, the IAEA is the 
second-most central actor but adds much more capacity to the network, including 
establishing best practices, conducting inspections for site security, and supporting 
security enhancements in numerous countries. Thus, identifying central actors helps 
identify who can influence the network or disseminate information the quickest, but does 
not indicate the specific function of an actor. 
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5. LOE 2 Prevent Transnational Shipment 
The purpose of LOE 2 is to prevent the transnational shipment of nuclear 
material. This includes various agreements and actions to detect nuclear material and stop 
it from exiting a country. If nuclear material is acquired in one state but another state is 
targeted for attack, it must be smuggled out of the country of origin. This presents a 
significant challenge, as the smuggled material will likely be a small quantity that is 
easily concealed and hard to detect.93 The nodes in this subnetwork contribute to the LOE 
2 mission in several ways: by establishing best practices for CP/NP in relation to 
radiological equipment exports, promoting best practices, and providing detection 
capability through equipment or training (Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4.  LOE 2 Sociogram 
The LOE 2 sociogram depicts a moderately dense network with a tightly 
connected cluster comprising the various U.S. agencies/programs. The subnetwork has a 
density score of .44, with just shy of half of all possible ties present. It is compact, with 
an average path length of 1.659 and a diameter of 3, though it is more compact on the 
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right side of the graph than the left. The density and compactness can be interpreted as a 
moderate degree of cooperation throughout the network, with more cooperation on the 
right side of the graph and less cooperation between the nodes on the left and bottom of 
the graph. Given the overall diameter and connectedness, information should spread well 
throughout the network. Importantly, every node has more than one connection to the rest 
of the network. This reduces the likelihood that a problem at any one node would prevent 
transmission to the rest of the network. The IAEA is the most central node in the LOE 2 
subnetwork, with the highest betweenness (18.863) and degree (9) scores. The UNSCR 
1540 Committee and OSCE are the next-most central nodes in terms of betweenness, 
with scores of 13.476 and 13.405, respectively. The sociogram makes it clear, though, 
that UNSCR 1540 and the IAEA are in the best positions of brokerage between the U.S. 
nodes on the right and the European nodes on the left. It is worth noting that DOS EXBS 
is the next-most central actor, with a degree of 8 and a betweenness of 5.5521, and is the 
only U.S. node with a relationship to a European-specific IGO.  
6. LOE 3 Protect State Borders 
The purpose of LOE 3 is to protect state borders against illicit nuclear material. 
This LOE includes a variety of actions to prevent such material from entering a given 
country. Once nuclear material has exited a country, it still must make it to its final 
destination; if LOE 2 fails, then LOE 3 is the barrier. Stopping nuclear material at a 
border presents several obstacles. Specifically in the EU, there are miles of unprotected 
border that can be breached from land and sea. Even if smugglers are using established 
ports, airports, or border crossings, detecting nuclear material most often requires special 
equipment.94 There are also well-developed smuggling routes in Europe which carry 
everything from cars to drugs to immigrants. The various nodes comprising the LOE 3 
subnetwork contribute in the following ways: physical security of borders, capacity 
building, or generation of intelligence/information (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5.  LOE 3 Sociogram 
The LOE 3 subnetwork is similar in structure to LOE 2—it is also moderately 
dense and compact. This subnetwork has a density score of .429, and each node averages 
5.57 ties. The network is compact; the average distance between nodes is 1.637, with a 
diameter of 3. Like in LOE 2, a cluster of U.S. nodes is present on the right side of the 
graph, creating uneven density and compactness in the network. Again, this can be 
interpreted as moderate cooperation throughout the network, with more cooperation on 
the right side than the left. An interesting difference is that the left side of the graph is 
centralized around Interpol. Interpol is slightly less central in the overall network than the 
FBI but would have more influence over the nodes on the left side of the graph. The FBI 
is the most central node in the LOE 3 subnetwork, with a degree of 8 and a betweenness 
of 15.202. The IAEA is the next-most central node and sits in between the two sides, with 
four ties to the right side and three ties to the left. 
7. LOE 4 Interdict Nuclear Material 
The purpose of the LOE 4 subnetwork is to interdict the nuclear material either 
during transnational movement or within the target country. Interdiction is unique 
amongst the LOEs because it is a mobile capability that can be implemented at any point 
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after the nuclear material is acquired, making it nonlinear. Interdiction can happen in the 
country of origin, during transnational movement, or after it has entered the target 
country. Which domain interdiction occurs in significantly impacts who conducts it and 
how. For example, the majority of recent nuclear material smuggling incidents have been 
interdicted in sovereign national space by domestic law enforcement or border security.95 
If interdiction occurs in international space, a military force is more likely to participate. 
The most challenging parts of interdiction are knowing that material needs to be 
interdicted at all and knowing where to find it. The tactical side of interdiction can be 
challenging but poses less of an obstacle. Once the nuclear material is located, most 
countries in the CNS-E network have the capacity to retrieve it. The nodes that comprise 
the LOE 4 subnetwork contribute to its purpose in the following ways: supporting 
existing legal CP/NP regulations, acquiring and disseminating intelligence, or supporting 
the interdiction mission (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.  LOE 4 Sociogram 
                                                 
95 CNS Global Incidents and Trafficking Database Nuclear Threat Initiative (March 2016).  
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The LOE 4 subnetwork is the smallest of the four and is correspondingly more 
compact. It has an average distance of 1.528 and a diameter of 2. It has a density score of 
.378 and an average degree of 3.4 out of a potential 12. In light of the size of the network, 
these metrics suggest it is the least dense of the four LOEs. Like in the previous LOEs, 
the density is not dispersed evenly. There are two distinct clusters in the graph, one on the 
left and another on the right. This depicts high cooperation within the clusters and low 
cooperation throughout the network as a whole. The two sides of the network are mostly 
connected through the FBI. Consequently, the FBI is the most central actor in the 
network, with the highest degree (6) and betweenness scores (7.833). Interpol and DTRA 
are the next-most central actors, respectively. Their positions indicate that Interpol would 
be more influential among the European nodes on the left side of the graph and DTRA 
more influential among the U.S. agencies. Perhaps the most interesting insight gathered 
from the LOE 4 sociogram is a path of coordination between European and U.S. agencies 
through the FBI. 
D. CNS-E NETWORK FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Applying SNA to the CNS-E network has illuminated the structure of the network 
in both metrics and graphs. The quantitative analysis reveals that the CNS-E network is 
highly dense and decentralized, and qualitative analysis confirms that the network is 
informal, meaning we can describe it as organic.96 This is an important categorization for 
the CNS-E network, because we can use organizational theory to determine the strengths 
and weaknesses of organic structures and assess whether or not this structure is the right 
fit for the network. After interpreting the structural analysis, we will review key actors 
and insights from the subnetworks.  
The characteristics that make the CNS-E network organic contribute to its 
effectiveness in numerous ways. High density allows information to transmit through the 
network quickly. It also adds resiliency to the network due to the presence of redundant 
paths between actors. This makes information flow reliable and unlikely to be interrupted 
by a single actor. The capacity for information sharing is crucial for a network dealing 
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with transnational problems, as it inherently involves multiple actors. High 
decentralization distributes power and decision making throughout the network. This is 
important in a complex environment, since there are more significant variables 
influencing performance than a small group of executives can control. By distributing 
power, the actors most affected by a problem and in possession of the most information 
can take immediate action as opposed to waiting for instruction. For instance, if nuclear 
material is stolen in Germany, they can immediately address the problem, whether by 
interdicting or informing other relevant players, without waiting for instruction from an 
executive body. This is a critical capability in time-sensitive cases. As we have discussed, 
decentralization also lends itself to informality, and the lack of standard operating 
procedures in informal organizations allows them to adapt to dynamic environments like 
counter nuclear smuggling. Bad actors will constantly search for new ways to obtain 
nuclear material. A network that can quickly adapt to emerging threats will be more 
successful than one entrenched in bureaucracy.  
The same organic characteristics of the CNS-E network that contribute to its 
effectiveness can also make it inefficient. Decentralized networks tend to have several 
drawbacks. First, the absence of executive power can make it difficult to move the 
network in a common direction. This is especially true for the CNS-E network. Unlike a 
decentralized business, the CNS-E network is predominately made up of sovereign states 
existing in an anarchic environment. Without a single executive, the CNS-E network may 
struggle to form a coherent strategy for achieving its purpose. It may fail to motivate the 
whole network to sanction a rouge state, or fail to agree on how to allocate resources. 
Perhaps most importantly, no single actor can direct the network to perform critical tasks 
like information sharing. Decentralized networks also face a coordination challenge. 
Given the transnational and time-sensitive nature of counter nuclear smuggling, a high 
degree of coordination is required for the CNS-E network to be effective. To achieve this, 
the network must invest significant resources in coordination mechanisms like full-time 
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integrators, crossfunctional teams, and frequent multi-actor meetings.97 Any effort short 
of these mechanisms will have much lower effectiveness. 
Despite the weaknesses of the organic structure, it is the most effective 
configuration for the CNS-E network. The effectiveness of a network’s structure depends 
on how well it fits the purpose and environment.98 Preventing smuggling is a difficult 
task, and, again, the environment in which it occurs is complex and dynamic, meaning 
that to be effective in this environment, an organization must be adaptable and 
decentralized. The organic structure of the CNS-E network is both. Its informality 
enables it to adapt to a dynamic environment and smart opponents; its decentralized 
power enables it to process a multitude of variables. Furthermore, the density of the 
network can allow it to meet its robust coordination requirements. Though adaptability 
and decentralization come at the cost of efficiency, this is an acceptable tradeoff for the 
CNS-E network simply because whole-network efficiency does not lend itself to 
effectiveness in complex, dynamic environments. Therefore, the CNS-E network is 
structured appropriately for its purpose and mission, providing it puts sufficient resources 
into coordination.  
The subnetwork analysis helped reveal key actors in each network. The strong ties 
subnetwork illustrates who is more likely to cooperate in situations that require strong 
ties. Key findings include: 
 
 Frontex, NATO, and Europol are the most central (influential) actors in 
the strong ties subnetwork. Importantly, they are regional organizations. 
International organizations in the CNS-E network, like Interpol or the UN, 
appear to lack the strong connections of regional organizations. 
 SELEC occupies a powerful broker position and represents an opportunity 
to gain stronger relations with Southeast European states (specifically via 
their law enforcement agencies). 
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 The United States occupies an important brokerage positon in the strong 
ties subnetwork, as it connects Eastern Bloc states such as Russia, 
Georgia, Belarus, and Armenia to the rest of the network.  
 The DOE is the strongest connection between the United States and 
Russia and is best suited to enhance cooperation. 
 Germany is significantly more influential in this network, in terms of the 
number of actors it is tied to, than any other state actor. 
 Strong relationships are facilitated by IGOs. 
 
The lines of effort subnetworks reduced countersmuggling into four missions. The 
key findings are: 
 LOE 1 is the largest subnetwork, suggesting the majority of the CNS-E 
network’s effort goes into nonproliferation activities. 
 The IAEA appears to be the most significant player in the subnetworks, 
based on the position it occupies in LOEs 1, 2, and 3 and the capabilities it 
contributes to each. 
 The FBI occupies central positions in LOE 3 and LOE 4. This implies that 
the FBI is the best conduit for cooperation between U.S. and European 
nodes for border-protection matters and interdiction.  
 LOEs 2, 3, and 4 show strong cooperation among U.S. nodes and among 
European nodes, but significantly less cooperation between U.S. and 
European nodes. Intermediary actors connecting the two groups serve an 
important role if/when coordination is required. The IAEA, the FBI, and to 
a lesser extent NATO and DOS EXBS currently occupy these positions. 
E. NETWORK ANOMALY 
According to the analysis, the CNS-E network is structured to effectively counter 
nuclear smuggling and all associated tasks, but qualitative research contradicts this. There 
is an abundance of literature documenting, and seeking to explain, the failure of 
intelligence sharing between European actors.99 As the CNS-E network predominantly 
comprises European actors, these findings also hold true for our network. The density of 
the network suggests information should travel through the network quickly and reliably, 
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so the structure of the network does not account for or explain the failure of intelligence 
sharing. Intelligence sharing is arguably the most important task the CNS-E network 
must do well to be effective. Therefore, it is worthwhile to explore possible explanations 
for this structural anomaly. 
The three IR theories each explain this anomaly differently. Realist theory would 
see the international institutions as mechanisms of the most powerful states and say that 
individual self-interest and security or power concerns limit the sharing of private 
information. Neoliberal institutionalist theory recognizes incentives for private 
information but would say that institutions have the potential to create an environment 
that would allow the sharing of sensitive information through changing the payoff 
structure, increasing the time horizon, and mitigating free riders. Constructivist theory 
would indicate that the lack of trust within the system is determined by the states 
themselves; a breakdown of sovereignty barriers would be possible if states elected to 
view the environment as friendly and not hostile. 
Domestic theory also could provide insight into the lack of intelligence sharing. 
Prospect theory would indicate that some leaders within Europe may be in a losses frame 
of mind and unhappy with the status quo. Their participation within the institutions 
creates fear of them exploiting sensitive information, as they are more willing to risk 
upsetting the current international order. Selectorate theory would propose that state 
leaders are currently unable to provide the necessary intelligence due to a lack of public 
support from their winning coalitions. Concerns over privacy and sovereignty dominate 
the public discourse in this arena, and leaders that choose to go against the will of their 
supporters will invariably be punished in upcoming elections. 
Now that the CNS-E network has been characterized using SNA, the function of 
the network can be assessed using vignettes based upon recent nuclear or terrorism 
incidents. The following chapter will assess the network in action based on two scenarios: 
nuclear threats originating in the European Union’s Schengen Area, and smuggling 
nuclear material or weapons into the European Union. 
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IV. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
In order to visualize the Counter Nuclear Smuggling–Europe network in action, 
we analyze two nuclear terrorism scenarios that would require the network’s response. 
The first scenario involves an attack utilizing nuclear or radiological material acquired in 
the European Union’s (EU) Schengen Area. The second scenario analyzes the network’s 
response to terrorists acquiring nuclear or radiological material outside of the EU and 
then smuggling the material across borders or into the EU to conduct an act of terrorism. 
Both scenarios incorporate factual circumstances from recent terror attacks in Europe and 
aspects of current nuclear terrorism threats in the form of vignettes.  
The framework for analyzing the scenarios involves identifying which nodes and 
LOEs will play significant roles in countering the threat, and analyzing the behavior of 
the network in a given scenario. The first step is to identify the operational and structural 
characteristics of the network when countering the specific threat. The second step is to 
analyze the individual LOEs, and the third step is to identify the significant actors in the 
scenario. The final step is to draw conclusions by assessing the interoperability of the 
actors across LOEs and inferring the strengths and weaknesses of the network in the 
scenario. Analyzing these cases and the network’s responses enables us to recommend 
improvements that will enhance the network’s response to similar scenarios in the future. 
These situational analyses reveal that the network is not static but behaves 
differently based on where threats originate, how smuggling takes place, and the location 
of the target. If European citizens acquire nuclear material and carry out acts of terror 
within the open-border Schengen Area, the organizations that prevent transnational 
shipment of nuclear material (LOE 2) and that secure borders (LOE 3) will play a limited 
role, if any, in preventing an attack. On the other hand, if terrorists acquire nuclear or 
radiological material outside of the Schengen Area and attempt to cross borders or 
smuggle it into the EU, the entire network should behave sequentially by LOE. The 
scenarios enable an analysis of the interactions between critical nodes and LOEs beyond 
SNA. The insights provided by these scenarios should help inform USG policy makers 
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and military officials attempting to influence partner capabilities and address emerging 
threats.  
A. SCENARIO 1: NUCLEAR THREATS ORIGINATING IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION’S SCHENGEN AREA 
The first scenario entails an attack on a nuclear facility in the Schengen Area, or 
an attack using nuclear or radiological material acquired in the Schengen Area. In this 
scenario, the three likely forms of nuclear terrorism are all possible. Terrorists can steal 
material and employ an improvised nuclear weapon, sabotage a nuclear facility, or 
detonate a radiological dispersion device, a “dirty bomb.”100 In order to conduct any of 
these attacks, the terrorists must first acquire material. Therefore, counterterrorism efforts 
in this scenario rely heavily upon efforts to safeguard nuclear and radiological material in 
Europe. In examining this line of effort, we discuss recent IS interest in nuclear and 
radiological material in Europe, the threat of sabotage, and nuclear security concerns in 
the EU.  
By using actual recent history as vignettes, we can create a plausible analysis of a 
domestic or homegrown attack in Europe. Despite numerous international agreements, 
organizations, and protocols, nuclear security in European states varies. IGOs, therefore, 
can incentivize states to comply with norms, but generally are less likely to act during a 
crisis. This scenario illuminates how an outside agency could best affect nuclear security 
efforts pre-crisis and then assist an EU state during crisis.  
1. Vignettes 
a. Vignette 1. Monitoring Nuclear Researchers 
Reporting indicates that IS actively monitored the activities of a senior nuclear 
researcher in Belgium prior to the November 2015 attacks in Paris. Belgian authorities, 
searching the home of a man connected to the terror cell, uncovered video surveillance of 
the researcher, who works at a facility with both highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 
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large quantities of radioisotopes.101 Officials speculate that the terror cell intended to 
kidnap the researcher or members of his family in order to gain access to the nuclear 
plant.102 Had the terrorists accessed material, they could potentially have used the HEU 
to construct nuclear weapons and the radioisotopes to construct a radioactive dirty bomb. 
b. Vignette 2. Insider Threats and Sabotage 
Rather than stealing material, terrorists could initiate a meltdown, which would 
require access to a nuclear reactor and knowledge of the facility’s inner workings. In 
2012, a Belgian nuclear facility worker named Ilyass Boughalab left his job to join IS in 
Syria. Boughalab worked at the Doel power plant for three years before joining IS and 
was ultimately killed in 2014.103 Although Boughalab was no longer working at the 
nuclear facility in 2014, an unsolved incident—believed to have been sabotage—
damaged and shut down a reactor, resulting in $100–200 million in damage.104 This 
incident did not cause the reactor to melt down or place anyone in danger, but the 
potential exists that future accidents or acts of sabotage could cause a serious nuclear 
incident. It is also possible that Boughalab shared his knowledge of Belgian nuclear 
security protocol with IS leadership in Syria. Additionally, both Germany and the 
Netherlands have recently voiced safety concerns over aging Belgian facilities and recent 
efforts by the Belgians to re-open closed facilities.105 Aging facilities, defecting workers, 
and unsolved incidents like this raise concerns over the threat of an insider attack. 
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Although this threat can be mitigated to some extent through security protocols, it is a 
concern not only for Belgium but for all countries with nuclear facilities.  
c. Vignette 3. Security at European Nuclear Facilities 
Security at Europe’s numerous nuclear facilities differs drastically by state. A 
2012 EU-sponsored nuclear facility assessment found significant disparities in nuclear 
security between facilities throughout the EU.106 Additionally, political activists have 
breached security measures at Western European nuclear facilities to bring attention to 
nuclear dangers and the lack of security.107 With half of the world’s research reactors and 
nearly half of its active power reactors located in Europe, the EU is home to a significant 
amount of nuclear material in various forms and quantities. This provides terrorists with a 
target-rich environment for nuclear terrorism.108  
2. The Network Structure 
An attack utilizing nuclear material in the Schengen Area primarily involves the 
organizations in LOEs 1 and 4, because terrorists could acquire, assemble, and detonate a 
weapon in Europe while avoiding the organizations responsible for transnational shipping 
and border security (LOEs 2 and 3). LOE 1 (Figure 7), the organizations whose goals are 
the inspection and safeguarding of nuclear material, and LOE 4 (Figure 8), the 
organizations that interdict terrorists and secure loose material, are on opposite ends of 
the NP/CP spectrum, but they share characteristics such as emphasis on local law 
enforcement and physical security.  
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Figure 7.  LOE 1 Sociogram 
 
Figure 8.  LOE 4 Sociogram 
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3. Analysis by LOE 
Because terrorists must acquire nuclear material in order to conduct nuclear 
terrorism, significant resources are rightfully directed at securing nuclear facilities (LOE 
1). As the sociogram depicts, the IAEA occupies the second-most central position in this 
network (behind the EU) and is assessed to be the most operationally active—however, 
the primary tasks of the IAEA and similar organizations such as EUATOM are 
establishing best practices and conducting routine inspections. The individual states must 
translate routine inspections and best practices into effective nuclear security policy. This 
means that despite the IAEA’s central position in the network, the responsibility for 
implementing and executing effective security falls on the individual states.109 This 
scenario presents challenges for the international CP community. Although securing 
nuclear material (LOE 1) is the most robust LOE within the network, with over three 
times as many nodes as LOE 4, LOE 1’s effectiveness varies from state to state. As a 
result, countries within the Schengen Area are only as safe as the weakest member state. 
This scenario requires a relationship between the many IGOs in LOE 1 that 
establish and regulate policy but operationally contribute little to security and the few 
organizations in LOE 4 that are charged with tracking, locating, and interdicting material. 
Interdicting nuclear terrorists (LOE 4) is, according to our network, the smallest LOE. 
LOE 4 could have the fewest nodes because preventing proliferation is preferred to 
interdicting proliferation, but it also may be because interdiction forces are generally the 
most unilateral—requiring sensitive intelligence and equipment. LOE 4 interdiction 
forces are the least likely to answer to an IGO, and therefore have limited nodes in our 
IGO network. Due to the United States-centric nature of the network, the FBI and 
Interpol are the most central organizations in this LOE. Based on centrality within the 
LOE, the best means for the USG to cooperate with European states and IGOs in LOE 4 
is through the FBI.  




4. Critical Nodes 
Cooperation between LOEs could be enhanced by linking the most central nodes 
in each network. Increased interoperability between the most central operational node in 
LOE 1, the IAEA, and the most central node in LOE 4, the FBI, should make the network 
more effective in countering this scenario. Though this would strengthen the network, it 
is unclear that security within individual states would improve. Ensuring that host nation 
security and interdiction capabilities increase may therefore require more proactive 
measures than linking the nodes most central to each LOE.  
We could also improve the network’s response to this scenario by identifying and 
enhancing nodes present in both relevant LOEs. Three nodes are present in both LOEs 1 
and 4: DoD DTRA, DOS Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative (NSOI), and GICINT. 
Both DTRA and NSOI provide a mechanism for bilateral engagement with the host 
nation rather than actual security or interdiction forces in their own right. The challenge 
with DTRA engagement is that partner-nation militaries likely play a limited role in 
domestic counterterrorism. Other than securing nuclear weapons on military installations, 
partner-nation militaries generally lack the authority to operate within their own borders. 
NSOI, on the other hand, engages with partner law enforcement agencies that are likely 
heavily involved in domestic CT activities. This means that while DTRA provides a 
military to military link, NSOI is the better means for engaging with local LEA that 
secure and interdict nuclear material.   
5. Scenario 1 Conclusions 
The strength of the network when countering this scenario is that the primary 
parties acting in both LOEs 1 and 4 are not IGOs but host-nation LEAs and security 
forces. Although outside organizations such as Interpol or Europol may assist with 
interdiction, operationally this scenario is extremely reliant on host-nation security. This 
should enable rapid and effective communication, as incentives to cooperation are high 
and barriers to information sharing are low among agencies within a given state. Through 
cooperation with international organizations and bilateral partnerships, the host nation 
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may be able to share and disseminate intelligence to heighten security in anticipation of 
future attacks. 
The biggest challenge for the network in this scenario is that open borders can 
give terrorists freedom of movement within the Schengen Area—border and shipping 
security are minimal and the requirement for international cooperation between EU states 
is high. Fortunately, the EU is the most central node in LOE 1, which should facilitate 
collaboration in the steady state and cooperation between EU states during crisis. 
Numerous USG nodes also occupy central locations in both LOEs, enabling the USG to 
influence this scenario.  
The IAEA and the FBI are the two nodes most central to this scenario, and 
DTRA, DOS NSOI, and GICINT are the only nodes in both LOEs. To enhance the 
network’s response to a threat emanating from within the EU, threat-based exercises 
could aid in assessing security at nuclear facilities and likely target areas. Working with 
organizations such as the IAEA, FBI, and DOS NSOI, military and law enforcement 
personnel could analyze nuclear facilities and likely target areas for vulnerabilities in 
order to enhance security measures. While IGOs may not play active roles in actually 
stopping attacks, proactive collective measures today will enhance the host nations’ 
responses tomorrow. Additionally, any efforts undertaken to enhance information sharing 
between states and through IGOs will enable the target states to better respond to acts of 
terrorism.  
B. SCENARIO 2: SMUGGLING NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACROSS STATE 
BORDERS OR INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S SCHENGEN AREA 
The second scenario involves terrorists smuggling nuclear weapons or material 
across state borders or into the Schengen Area in order to conduct an act of terrorism. 
This involves the entire network, but to better understand the progression of smuggling, 
we will still analyze the network by LOE. In this case, smuggling follows a linear 
progression as the smuggler attempts to defeat each LOE in sequential order. To further 
understand this scenario, we examine the nuclear black market in Eastern Europe, 
examples of lost or missing radiological and nuclear material, and trafficking routes in 
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Europe. We will see that while significant resources are devoted to each LOE, 
operationally there is limited overlap across LOEs and in general the network lacks unity.  
1. Vignettes 
a. Vignette 1. Nuclear Black Market in Moldova 
According to recent reports, with assistance from the FBI, Moldovan authorities 
uncovered four attempts in the last five years to smuggle nuclear material to the Middle 
East through Moldova. The nuclear material is believed to be originating in Russia; 
however, the existence of a nuclear black market suggests that traffickers may have 
stockpiles of material left over from the Cold War. In the most recent instance, nuclear 
traffickers suggested that IS use the material to attack the West. Fortunately, the potential 
buyer was not an IS operative but an undercover agent.110 The existence of actual buyers 
therefore remains uncertain. This interdiction of nuclear trafficking suggests that aspects 
of the CP network are performing effectively; however, with unknown quantities of 
nuclear material possibly on the market, there is potential that material could find its way 
into the hands of violent extremists. 
b. Vignette 2. Missing Nuclear and Radiological Material 
 States have reported nuclear and radiological material missing all over the world. 
As recently as November 2015, Baghdad reported radiological material missing to the 
IAEA. The material, used by oil companies to test flaws in oil and gas, was stored in a 
facility in the southern Iraqi city of Basra. After an unclear amount of time, the material 
was later discovered only a few kilometers from its storage facility. Recovery of the 
level-two radiological material ended fears that IS had stolen it to create a dirty bomb, but 
does not answer questions about how the material went missing in the first place. This 
situation is indicative of a larger issue, which is the prevalence of dual-use nuclear and 
radiological material all over the world. Because radiological material is common in 
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research facilities, hospitals, and other high-technology industries, the potential for 
terrorists to acquire this material is relatively high.111 Dr. ElBaradei, then director general 
of the IAEA, gave this warning to the United Nations General Assembly in 2008: 
The possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear or other radioactive material 
remains a grave threat… The number of incidents reported to the Agency 
involving the theft or loss of nuclear or radioactive material is disturbingly 
high… Equally troubling is the fact that much of this material is not 
subsequently recovered. Sometimes material is found which had not been 
reported missing.112 
c. Vignette 3. Smuggling in Europe 
The recent attacks by IS in Paris and Brussels, as well as contemporary literature, 
reveal a nexus between terrorists, proliferators, and traffickers. According to reports, 
numerous members of the terrorist cell who carried out the Paris attack were directly 
affiliated with IS, including the mastermind behind the attack, who had served as an IS 
commander in Syria. Reporting indicates that having traveled from Europe to Syria, these 
known IS members were able to return to Europe undetected by Western intelligence. 
How these IS members, including the Paris mastermind and IS commander Abdelhamid 
Abaaoud, reentered the EU is unclear. Biometric data indicates that two individuals who 
participated in the Paris attack entered the EU as refugees, likely using stolen 
passports.113 In addition to refugee migration, numerous forms of trafficking exist in 
Europe and within the EU. These include drugs, weapons, and human trafficking routes 
and networks. Although significant resources are directed toward countering these 
problems, trafficking persists because demand exists, and conceivably these same 
networks could facilitate transfers of nuclear materials.114 
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2. The Network Structure 
This scenario involves the entire network, including all four LOEs (Figures 9–12) 
as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation among the affected states. In this 
scenario, nuclear or radiological material being smuggled into Europe could originate 
anywhere in the world. With loose nuclear and radiological material believed to be 
unaccounted for globally, LOE 1 may play a limited role here, and LOEs 2 and 3 are 
critical to stopping nuclear smuggling. If nuclear terrorists were to enter the EU’s 
Schengen Area, it appears that bilateral cooperation among the various states, with 
assistance from IGOs, is the most efficient means of identifying and interdicting those 
terrorists. 
 
Figure 9.  LOE 1 Sociogram 
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Figure 10.  LOE 2 Sociogram 
 
Figure 11.  LOE 3 Sociogram 
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Figure 12.  LOE 4 Sociogram 
3. Analysis by LOE 
Generally, LOE 2 involves cooperation between law enforcement and sensor-
focused IGOs and between host-nation LEAs and security forces. Like in LOE 1, the 
IAEA is the most central node in LOE 2 (see Figure 10); however, numerous other nodes 
also have operational roles. These include USG programs such as the Department of 
State’s Export Control and Related Border Security program, the Department of Energy’s 
Global Threat Reduction program, and the Department of Homeland Security’s Container 
Security Initiative. The prominence of USG organizations in LOE 2 indicates that there 
are numerous opportunities to influence European IGOs’ and states’ efforts to counter 
transnational shipping of nuclear material.  
An emphasis on detection and interdiction of nuclear material links LOEs 2 and 3; 
however, the generally porous borders in Europe present challenges for LOE 3. Outside 
of the EU, European border security varies from state to state; the relative ease with 
which refugees can enter the Schengen Area is also a significant concern for international 
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CT and CP communities.115 The open borders within the Schengen Area are intended to 
allow unobstructed movement between member states, but numerous states in the EU 
closed borders in early 2016 in order to curb the flow of migrants.116 If there were a 
credible WMD threat in Europe, it appears possible that EU states would secure their 
borders to protect their citizens. Closing borders could enhance LOEs 2–4 temporarily; 
however, opening communication and information sharing between states is a better 
long-term solution to the threat of international terrorism.  
In order for the nodes in LOE 4 to interdict targets, LOEs 1–3 must pass timely 
intelligence. Fortunately, both LOEs 3 and 4 are generally state focused, with the FBI and 
Interpol occupying critical positions in both. Interpol’s huge membership, however, 
indicates that despite its central location in the network, actionable intelligence will most 
likely travel through another means. This is because states are reluctant to share sensitive 
intelligence in forums that include numerous diverse members such as the IAEA, which 
includes 190 member states. Due to the highly sensitive nature of this type of 
information, the FBI is the most likely organization to connect LOE 3 to the interdiction 
forces in LOE 4.  
The Moldovan interdiction case is a successful application of LOE 4; however, 
strengthening European interdiction forces would enhance this LOE. The cooperative 
bilateral relationship between the FBI and Moldovan authorities may indicate that the 
USG has a robust global network of interdiction forces, but it could also be an unusually 
effective relationship due to geographic and threat-based requirements. Whether or not 
the FBI is deeply connected throughout Europe, U.S. CP efforts in Europe could be 
enhanced by creating redundant capabilities organic to European states. In other words, 
rather than relying on the FBI to interdict nuclear smugglers in Moldova, the U.S. 
government could strengthen the network by empowering European organizations with 
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similar capabilities. Enhanced intelligence sharing between Frontex and Europol, both 
EU subagencies, could achieve this goal; however, in many cases, this would still require 
individual states to share intelligence with an IGO.  
4. Critical Nodes 
We see that several entities occupy central positions in numerous phases; 
however, no one organization is central throughout all the LOEs. The aggregate network 
showed that Frontex, Europol, and NATO are the most central organizations in the 
network, but none of these nodes are prominent in the LOE construct. When attempting 
to connect actors across LOEs, the most significant organizations are the IAEA in LOEs 
1 and 2, and both the FBI and Interpol in LOEs 3 and 4. Fortunately there is overlap, as 
the IAEA is also a player in LOE 3 and Interpol is present in LOE 2. Thus, there is 
continuity across the LOEs, though no one actor is central to all four. 
5. Scenario 2 Conclusions 
The network’s robust scope and reach are significant assets when countering 
nuclear smuggling originating outside of the EU; however, the size of the network and 
the drastically different purposes of its nodes result in the network lacking unity of effort. 
This could be fixed by identifying and empowering one node that would be central to all 
four lines of effort. As it stands now, no single IGO in our network has this holistic view 
of the other nodes and their activities. Therefore, unifying the network may fall to one of 
the three most central nodes in the strong ties subnetwork. 
This scenario requires cooperation between numerous lines of effort, some of 
which interact only infrequently. In order for these organizations to effectively cooperate 
in crisis, centralized collaboration should take place pre-crisis. Coordination enables trust 
among the organizations, which is critical for strong cooperation across agencies, 
governments, and lines of effort. A European counterproliferation center, similar to the 
U.S. NCPC and NCTC, could achieve this aim. As a centralized repository for 
information related to NP and CP, such an agency could interconnect the disparate 
organizations operating across the four separate lines of effort.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
The analysis and recommendations in this chapter do not address all aspects of the 
CNS-E network, but provide insights into its functions. The two scenarios provide the 
following critical takeaways: 
 SNA shows that Frontex, NATO, and Europol are the most central actors 
in the strong ties subnetwork. Analysis of the scenarios revealed that while 
none of these organizations are prominent in more than one LOE, no 
organization in the network is prominent across all four LOEs. Therefore, 
Frontex, NATO, and Europol are the three organizations that may be best 
positioned to unify the network. 
 We see that much of the EU is reliant upon Schengen Area border 
security. Similar to the U.S. approach to CT outlined in the NMS, the EU 
could be more proactive outside its own borders. According to SNA, 
strengthening relations with SELEC could partially achieve this goal in 
southeastern Europe, while SNA also shows us that the USG, specifically 
DOE, is in the best position to affect relations with Russia and other 
former Soviet states. Therefore, the EU could best engage with SELEC 
and Russia through USG assistance in order to affect security east of its 
borders.  
 IGOs occupy the most central positions in LOEs 1 and 2; the FBI occupies 
the most central position in LOEs 3 and 4. This suggests that international 
cooperation is highest in nonproliferation, while bilateral relationships 
become more critical in CP. IGOs play a role in border security and 
interdiction; however, the FBI’s prominent position in the network 
suggests that the USG can better affect these LOEs through bilateral 
relationships with specific states.  
 Analysis of the scenarios reveals that, although countering threats 
emanating from within the Schengen Area involves NP and CP nodes, 
operationally this scenario is heavily reliant upon individual state security. 
Thus, proactive IGO involvement may be more efficient for Europe as a 
whole, but bilateral engagement is the most effective tool for countering 
nuclear terrorists in Europe. 
This chapter enabled qualitative analysis of not only the network but also the 
findings from SNA. By applying the network to realistic threats in the European theater, 
we were able to draw conclusions that apply to the broader CP community. The next 
chapter applies these findings to the larger issues of international relations and 
interagency cooperation in order to formulate recommendations for policy makers.  
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V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The potential for nuclear terrorism continues to be a threat to Europe and the 
world. This research has studied the obstacles to cooperation and collaboration with 
CNS-E efforts and the opportunities that exist to enhance them. The environment in 
Europe is complex, requiring an agile and adaptive network to suit it. The U.S. and 
European efforts to address the evolving terrorism networks, which are increasingly less 
hierarchical and more organic, have become less compartmentalized and have improved 
their sharing of information. Even as the shared threat of terrorism has provided a 
common motivation to prevent it, reducing the barriers to cooperation, recent attacks 
show that improvement is still necessary. International CP efforts lack a shared view of 
the nuclear threat, which reduces the incentives to cooperate.  
Our research sought to better understand how the CNS-E efforts relate to each 
other through quantitative and qualitative analysis. Through the use of SNA, we analyzed 
the network’s organization and its strengths and weaknesses related to the CP 
environment. The case studies were a way to analyze the network using plausible 
scenarios that would reveal the network’s current readiness and capability to address a 
terrorist threat in the future. This chapter will present both the empirical and analytical 
findings of our research. We will then provide potential recommendations and policy 
implications for the CNS-E and the broader international security environment. This 
chapter will conclude with a discussion of future research that is still necessary in this 
issue area. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Our research has determined that, while the CNS-E network fits the mission and 
environment, it remains difficult for states to share relevant information within the 
network. Bilateral agreements have been utilized extensively to get around sharing 
information with the broader network, as was demonstrated in the successful Moldovan 
interdiction case. While the existence of bilateral agreements can be an indicator of trust 
between states, these agreements do not assist the broader network in collectively 
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addressing CP issues. There is a balance between sharing relevant information with the 
network, which trades efficiency for synchronization, and using bilateral relationships, 
which are efficient at the expense of network synchronization. The network currently 
tends to utilize bilateral intelligence sharing rather than networked solutions, which limits 
the cooperative potential of the network and hinders the synchronization of efforts.117 
Our recommendations to structurally improve the network’s cooperative potential 
and the policy implications of those recommendations were informed by four major 
findings. The first identifies that the CNS-E network fits the environment, but that comes 
at a cost. The CNS-E network is an organic structure. It is highly decentralized, dense, 
and informal, with no single actor exercising authority over the others. This structure 
should support quick and reliable information exchange through the multiple pathways 
between most nodes. Power is also distributed throughout the network, allowing nodes to 
quickly react to situations as they arise. The relative lack of rules governing the network 
enables rapid adaptation to the dynamic threats inherent to transnational crimes. Overall, 
the network is configured well in light of its task of countering nuclear smuggling and the 
complex and dynamic environment it operates in. On the downside, the lack of an 
executive authority makes it difficult to ensure the network is moving toward a unified 
goal and communicating effectively. The extreme decentralization of the network 
requires time and resource-intensive communication. Failure to coordinate can result in 
redundant work, or worse, ineffective practices. 
Our second finding is that a major obstacle to cooperation and collaboration in 
CNS-E is the incentive for states to maintain private information. Even with the 
organizational mechanisms and the relationships in place, states tend to withhold 
sensitive information that would be helpful to other members of the network. James 
Fearon argues that a state’s desire to have current or future issues resolved in its favor 
provides strong incentives to maintain private information and in some cases to 
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misrepresent capability and readiness.118 Some of the IGOs studied do attempt to share 
information, and by changing the payoff structure, increasing the time horizon, and 
mitigating free-rider problems, institutions are able to overcome some of the hurdles.119 
However, key elements of intelligence continue to be difficult to share with a broader 
community, particularly when doing so entails perceived violations of state sovereignty 
and sharing information about domestic citizens.120  
Our third major finding is that the network could benefit from a move toward 
centralized organization. The current extreme decentralization of the CNS-E network 
creates several problems. The network lacks a single coherent strategy guiding all actors. 
The difficulty of coordination in such a decentralized network compounds the lack of 
strategy. The result is a diverse group of IGOs, agencies, and programs that often have 
redundant tasks and lead to wasted resources. Though it is unrealistic for any one actor to 
exercise executive authority over other actors, specifically sovereign states, empowering 
fewer nodes with broader authority and responsibility would reduce redundant efforts and 
entities, improve coordination, and make the network more effective.  
Our final network finding indicates that the CNS-E network needs stronger 
relationships, not more relationships. Currently, there are an abundance of ties between 
actors, but far fewer strong ties between actors. Strong ties will facilitate better 
cooperation and, more importantly, intelligence sharing, which is the most critical task if 
the CNS-E network is to succeed. The trust needed for states to share high-level 
intelligence requires strong relationships as a prerequisite. Efforts should focus on 
strengthening key ties rather than creating more superficial ties. 
International governmental organizations, especially regionally focused ones, 
facilitate strong relationships. Our strong ties subnetwork demonstrates that Europol and 
Frontex, both agencies of the European Union, account for a significant number of strong 
relationships in Europe. This is in contrast to international IGOs, like the United Nations 
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and INTERPOL. This suggests that regional IGOs are more suitable organizations for 
countering problems like transnational smuggling—that is, problems that require trust 
and intelligence sharing. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Based on the significant findings, we have four recommendations or implications 
for policy makers. Our first two recommendations identify strategic policy possibilities to 
improve information sharing in the international environment while states still have an 
incentive to keep information private. The second two recommendations provide 
USSOCOM and NSHQ with operational ways that those unique organizations can impact 
the network’s CP efforts.  
Actors in the CNS-E network should focus on strengthening vital ties rather than 
building numerous weak ties. There are too many actors in the network to establish 
strong bilateral relations with each, and most actors lack the resources to do so. 
Furthermore, there is little value in establishing and maintaining superficial relations. 
Each actor should strategically target specific ties that contribute most to its policy 
objectives and strengthen those ties. The best ways to establish strong ties are highly 
dependent on the actor and situation. In general, bilateral efforts may provide the highest 
likelihood of achieving strong relations but are resource intensive. The next-best option is 
participation in regional IGOs. These organizations can provide strong multilateral 
relations and are more efficient than the bilateral approach. 
In order for organizations in the network to enhance cooperation, communities of 
practice should exist both physically and in virtual space to facilitate the sharing of 
relevant information and intelligence when necessary. Major IGOs—potentially NATO, 
the EU, or SELEC—could serve as communications hubs to which other entities, sub-
IGOs and states, send liaisons in order to create an environment where resources and 
authorities can be fused to create a whole greater than its parts. A regional or functional 
approach would reduce the number of participants and encourage broader information 
sharing within the communications hubs. Additionally, by centralizing the network, this 
could provide better unity of effort for planning while retaining agility in execution. The 
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USSOCOM J3I or Europol structure could act as a model for future communications 
hubs. In both cases, the sponsor agency provides a collaborative space where liaisons—
senior representatives of their parent agencies—interact both formally and informally to 
facilitate the transfer of information and intelligence across the network to address 
current requirements as effectively as possible. 
USSOCOM and NSHQ could have a positive impact in the CNS-E network by 
working with member-state law enforcement agencies to enhance interdiction 
capabilities. Limitations in legal authority often preclude partner SOF from operating 
within their own borders; therefore, engaging with LEAs enables SOF and other U.S. 
agencies to enhance partner-nation capabilities. In recent years, USSOF trained with 
European partners to enhance the partner nations’ abilities to conduct expeditionary 
coalition operations and to counter traditional threats such as Russia. Historically, 
USSOF also conduct military engagements to counter partner-nation internal threats. 
Expanding these missions to include engagements with partner LEAs could enhance CT 
and CP interoperability and cooperation.  
USSOCOM and NSHQ could enhance the CNS-E network by working with U.S. 
agencies, IGOs, and partner nations to assess and improve security in European states. 
Assessment teams, known as red cells, could identify vulnerabilities in order to enhance 
partner-nation security at nuclear facilities, as well as at possible targets. The red cells 
would plan attacks as if they were terrorists in order to test security and law enforcement 
response. These missions would provide valuable training for both the SOF unit 
reconnoitering and planning the attack and the security forces that must respond to a 
sophisticated threat. Red cell activities could include assessments of security at airports, 
train stations, stadiums, and cultural centers deemed to be likely targets. This could 
enhance both LOEs 1 and 4 by repurposing existing SOF engagements in Europe.  
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The CNS-E is complex and therefore presents many opportunities for future 
research. Countering nuclear smuggling requires interactions of multiple states, IGOs, 
NGOs, and multinational corporations (MNCs). Future research is necessary to better 
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understand the impacts of NGOs and MNCs on the CP network. Government-affiliated 
organizations are often denied access to areas that NGOs can access due to their 
politically neutral status. Better understanding NGOs’ missions, areas of operation, and 
motivations could enhance the network’s scope and reach. MNCs, on the other hand, vary 
in their willingness to cooperate with state governments and generally are motivated 
exclusively by profits; they are often also the vehicles for transfers of dual-use 
technologies that, in the wrong hands, could be used for nefarious purposes. An 
assessment of the MNCs in a given theater could identify potential proliferation risks and 
opportunities to engage with MNCs for CP purposes.  
Further research is also necessary to determine ways in which the CNS-E could 
overcome the challenges of sharing sensitive information and timely intelligence to better 
cooperate in CP efforts. While we have made a few recommendations on ways to 
structurally change or adapt the network to facilitate intelligence sharing, fully exploring 
this subject was outside the scope of our project. Finally, additional research into the 
current nuclear smuggling threat would be helpful to better understand CNS-E 
requirements. As with many research efforts, countering nuclear smuggling is a dynamic 
field that is constantly adjusting as multiple entities seek to outmaneuver the others. Our 
research marks a beginning to understanding this complex issue area and providing ways 




APPENDIX A.  FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIAL NETWORK 
ANALYSIS 
SNA is an assembly of theories and methods from varying academic disciplines 
including sociology and statistics. It was developed to fulfill the need for an empirically 
based social science.121 Though its beginnings are in sociology, today it is employed in 
many fields, from anthropology to economics. The goal of SNA is to study the causes 
and consequences of network structures through empirical methods; a fundamental 
assumption of SNA is that the behavior and values of an individual are determined not by 
individual characteristics but by the structure of the networks in which the individual is 
embedded.122 For example, in explaining the different outcomes of two identical 
businesses located in different industrial cities, an individualistic approach would 
examine attributes of each business such as leadership, management, etc. SNA examines 
the structure of the networks of each business and the position each business occupies 
within its network. Perhaps the successful business was located in an industry hub with 
better access to important partners, like Silicon Valley. SNA works on the premise that 
this kind of analysis is vital to understanding the behavior and effectiveness of any given 
organization or entity. 
A. BASIC TERMINOLOGY 
All social networks consist of two elements: a limited set of actors and the 
relations between the actors. This includes a variety of common people groups, from 
families to businesses. A common mistake is to assume networks only include groups 
that have specific structural characteristics. Most commonly, it is assumed that only 
highly decentralized groups, such as terrorist groups, qualify as networks.123 This is not 
the case. A company with a rigid hierarchy is still a network. Importantly, SNA is not 
limited to networks of individuals. The actors comprising the network, called nodes, can 
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be individual people, groups of people, or institutions and are represented by dots on a 
sociogram (network map). The relationships between nodes are called ties, represented 
by lines on a sociogram. A tie can be any of a variety of relations including friendship, 
respect, communication, etc. Ties can also be directional; for example, they may show 
one-way communication between actors. Lastly, ties vary by strength. If a feeling of trust 
is scaled from 1–3, the strength of the tie can be represented visually and factored into the 
numerous metrics. Attributes are characteristics of a node and can include information 
such as age and gender for an individual or democracy score or gross domestic product 
for a country. The structure of the network is called topography and is characterized by 
several dimensions and determined by the arrangement of nodes and the ties between 
them.124 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
In Disrupting Dark Networks, Dr. Sean Everton lists several assumptions as the 
foundation for SNA methods.125 They are:  
 Actors and their actions are interdependent on one another, not 
independent. 
 Social structures are made up of patterns of ties between actors. 
 Patterns of ties create social networks that exhibit their own characteristics 
and are more than the sum of their parts.  
 An actor’s behavior, beliefs, and norms are greatly influenced by their 
position in a social network. 
C. ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Networks can be analyzed from different perspectives and at different levels 
depending on the researcher’s needs. Each type of analysis illuminates separate 
characteristics of the network. SNA evaluates networks from two perspectives: roles and 
positions.126 A role-based approach focuses on the direct and indirect ties between actors 
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and the effects those ties have on behavior. Ties between actors form a social structure, 
much like a physical structure, which exhibits varying configurations and behavior. A 
position-based approach looks for nodes or groups that occupy similar positions in the 
network, called structural equivalence. When actors have comparable ties to other 
comparable actors, they are considered structurally equivalent.127 For instance, if one is 
analyzing a school district, one will find that the principals of each school have similar 
ties to other actors in the network, such as teachers and administrators. The social 
structure surrounding each principle will be similar, creating a structural equivalence. 
Importantly, it can be assumed that structurally equivalent nodes, even lacking 
connection, will behave similarly.128  
The different levels of analysis include micro (individual), meso (group), and 
macro (organizational).129 The microlevel of analysis is focused on individual nodes. The 
most common metrics applied at the microlevel are types of centrality. There are 
numerous measures of centrality, all of which assess the importance or influence of a 
node in the network. What determines importance varies depending on the type of tie and 
the function of the network. When trying to identify the actor with the most support in a 
trust network, degree centrality—that is, having the most direct ties—may be the most 
important factor. If trying to identify the actor who can most efficiently pass intelligence 
throughout an information-sharing network, betweenness centrality—that is, how 
frequently an actor lies on the shortest path between any pair of other actors in the 
network—may be the most important. Closeness centrality is another metric indicating 
importance and measures how close an actor is, by average distance, to all other actors in 
the network. Eigenvector centrality weighs ties by how central the actors are on the other 
end of the tie; ties to more-central actors are weighted more heavily than ties to 
peripheral actors.130 In addition to centrality, brokerage is an important position at the 
node level. A broker connects otherwise separated actors or groups of actors. Given their 
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position, it is assumed brokers control the flow of information or resources.131 Lastly, 
attributes of actors are often added to networks to help make sense of network structure. 
For example, when looking at friendship ties among university faculty, attributes such as 
gender, age, or department affiliation may correlate with structures within the network. 
Analysis at the mesolevel is focused on subgroups within the network. A 
subgroup is a cluster of nodes that have strong ties with one another as compared with the 
rest of the network. It is assumed that subgroups, due to their stronger ties, will share 
norms and exhibit similar behavior.132 There is an abundance of methods for detecting 
subgroups in a network, each with a different algorithm and definition of a subgroup. 
Components are subgroups composed of actors tied directly or indirectly to one another, 
but not tied to other subgroups. Components are better identified in directed networks and 
may not be a useful concept for undirected and dense networks. One type of component 
is a clique, a subgroup in which each actor is directly connected to all other actors. 
Cliques are considered a strong type of subgroup because of the direct and intense ties 
between all actors. However, in reality it is difficult to find subgroups that qualify as 
cliques because lack of complete connectedness. The concept of K-cores is a method for 
detecting subgroups. It identifies all actors who share a number (K) of ties. All actors in a 
three-core will have three or more ties to other actors in the three-core. The last subgroup 
detection method covered is Newman groups. This method identifies subgroups as those 
with more internal ties and fewer external ties than a randomized graph of equal size and 
number of ties would have.133 In addition to ties, attributes can also be used to identify 
subgroups.  
The macrolevel of analysis focuses on the structure, or topography, of the whole 
network. Understanding the structure of a network is crucial for two reasons. First, actors 
within the network and their behavior, opportunities, and constraints are largely 
determined by structure. Second, the structural characteristics determine what tasks a 
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network will succeed or fail at.134 The most important structural features are density and 
centralization. Density is the degree to which a network is connected. Highly dense 
networks have a greater degree of influence over their members and can share 
information more efficiently than sparse networks. Centralization is the degree to which 
a network is centered on a few actors; it is associated with hierarchy. Hierarchal networks 
exhibit greater control and can perform mundane tasks more efficiently than heterarchical 
networks.135 Both density and centralization have their own measures; still, they should 
be considered side by side when analyzing structure. Other measurements including 
network size (number of nodes), diameter (the longest geodesic), and average distance 
between all nodes should also be considered. The structure of a network often conforms 
to one of several configurations identified by organization design theorists. Identifying 
the configuration of a whole network provides the analyst with significant insights into 
the strengths and weaknesses of the network.  
Social network analysts look at networks from different perspectives—roles and 
positions—and at different levels—micro, meso, and macro. What underpins each type of 
analysis is structuralism. This tenet of SNA regards the social structure as a critical factor 
influencing actors in a network. Every measurement, in some fashion, provides 
information about the social structure of the network, either at the node, group, or 
network level. Analysts disagree, however, about how much influence structure has on 
actors.136 The structural determinist considers structure as the sole cause of behavior and 
removes human agency as a factor. Conversely, structural instrumentalists recognize the 
significance of structure but allow for other factors, including rational choice and 
maximum utility. Structural constructionism also allows for human agency, but as it 
concerns norms, culture, and behavioral economics.  
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D. EXPLANATIONS 
There are four mechanisms that explain how networks, or the position of nodes, 
cause certain outcomes.137 The most widely applied mechanism is transmission. 
Transmission views ties within a network as conduits for the flow of physical and 
nonphysical things. Ideas, services, trust, disease, and communication are all examples of 
the types of things that can be transmitted through a network. This explanation typically 
looks at metrics that show how well a network transmits things and which actors control 
the flow of those things. The concept of adaptation states that nodes will exhibit the same 
behavior when they occupy similar positions in the network—that is, the structure of the 
ties and types of actors they are connected to are comparable. It follows that two actors in 
similar positions within a network will have similar opportunities and constraints. 
Binding occurs when two or more nodes join together and create something greater than 
the sum of their parts. When nodes bind together, a structure is created and a group with 
its own dynamics forms. Lastly, exclusion occurs when a tie between two nodes excludes 
a tie with a third node and further undermines the third node’s relations with others. This 
is commonly seen in competitive situations like bargaining.138 If a business is in dire 
need of an engineer and two engineers apply for the job, the business has its choice. 
However, if one of the engineers takes another job, now the choice is removed and the 
bargaining power of the remaining engineer is increased. These four mechanisms—
transmission, adaptation, binding, and exclusion—underpin the majority of causal 
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APPENDIX B.  NON-STATE ACTOR LIST 
This appendix provides a brief description of the IGOs, international agreements, 
and sub-state actors in the CNS-E network.  
Commonwealth of Independent States. The CIS is a regional association of 
states that aims to improve multistate cooperation in trade, finance, lawmaking, and 
security. It has an established free trade zone and a collective defense alliance that are 
open to all members.  
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization. The major tasks of the 
CTBTO are to promote the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to 
enhance the verification regimes. The CTBT bans nuclear explosions by all countries to 
impede the development of new or improved nuclear weapons.  
DHS Container Security Initiative. CSI is a program implemented by the 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection under the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security. The purpose of the program is to mitigate threats from cargo containers bound 
for the United States. It achieves this by screening cargo containers at international ports.  
DoD Defense Threat Reduction Agency. DTRA is an agency of the U.S. 
Department of Defense. It is the primary combat support agency for countering WMDs. 
DTRA’s primary functions include threat reduction, threat control, and combat support.  
DoD European Command. USEUCOM is a U.S. Department of Defense 
Combatant Command for the European theatre. Their key tasks include countering 
transnational threats, and maintaining ready forces for contingencies plans.  
DOE Global Threat Reduction Initiative. GTRI is a program of the U.S. 
Department of Energy. Its primary mission is to prevent nuclear terrorism by converting, 
removing, or protecting vulnerable nuclear material at civilian facilities worldwide.  
DOE Global Material Security. GMS is an office of the U.S. Department of 
Energy. Its mission is to prevent nuclear proliferation by helping partner countries secure 
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nuclear-related material and build the capacity to prevent the illicit trafficking of such 
material.      
DOS Export Control and Related Border Security. EXBS is a program of the 
U.S. Department of State. Its mission is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction by helping partner countries establish effective trade control systems and 
build capacity to enforce border security.  
DOS Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative. NSOI is a program of the U.S. 
Department of State. Its mission is to prevent international nuclear smuggling by 
partnering with select countries to increase their ability to prevent, detect, and interdict 
smuggled nuclear-related material. 
European Union. The EU is a political and economic union of 28 European 
countries. Its establishment has enabled the free movement of people, goods, and money 
across most of the European continent. The EU has its own governing body that 
coordinates policy across the member states in the realms of security, justice, 
environment, human rights, and health.  
European Union CBRN Centers of Excellence. The CBRN COE is a program 
of the EU. Its mission is to increase regional security by strengthening the capacity of 
states, external to the EU, to mitigate CBRN risks. It achieves this by providing expertise 
and funding to partner nations to overcome identified gaps in mitigation capabilities.  
Europol. Europol is the law enforcement agency of the EU. Its mission is to 
maintain European security by assisting and facilitating cooperation between member 
states to fight serious transnational crime and terrorism.  
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI is the primary domestic intelligence 
and law enforcement agency for the United States. Its primary mission is ensuring U.S. 
national security by conducting counterterrorism and counterintelligence activities, as 
well as criminal investigations.  
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Frontières Extérieures. Frontex is the border security agency of the EU. Its 
mission is to help secure the European Union’s external borders by promoting, 
coordinating, and developing border management practices between member states.  
G7 Global Partnership. The G7 is an intergovernmental forum comprising seven 
major industrialized countries and the EU. It serves as the primary forum to discuss 
global issues such as international security cooperation and economic growth. The G7 
supports non-proliferation through the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons 
and Material of Mass Destruction.   
International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA is an international 
organization established to be the world’s center for nuclear cooperation. It is responsible 
for the safe and peaceful use of nuclear technology around the world. The IAEA conducts 
numerous activities to achieve their mission from establishing safety and security 
guidelines to inspecting nuclear facilities.    
Interpol. Interpol is an intergovernmental organization with the primary task of 
fighting transnational crime such as terrorism, weapons smuggling, and drug trafficking. 
They facilitate international law enforcement cooperation and assist member states to 
combat crime.  
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO is a political and military alliance 
comprising mostly European countries, the United States, and Canada. The alliance 
promotes democratic values and cooperation in security and defense.  
Nuclear Security Summit. The NSS comprised three international summits 
focused on preventing nuclear terrorism. The summits produced commitments and 
declarations of intent from attending countries to improve nuclear security.  
Nuclear Suppliers Group. NSG is an intergovernmental organization comprising 
countries that export nuclear material or equipment. It aims to prevent nuclear 
proliferation by implementing guidelines for nuclear and nuclear-related exports.   
Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe. OSCE is an 
intergovernmental organization comprising 57 countries from Europe, North America, 
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and Central Asia. The organization is focused on security cooperation across multiple 
dimensions including military, political, economic, and human.  
Proliferation Security Initiative. PSI is an international agreement aimed at 
preventing the trafficking of WMDs and related material. Participating states commit to 
interdiction principles that include establishing the capacity to detect and interdict WMD 
material and establishing laws to facilitate the interdiction and seizure of such material.   
Southeast European Law Enforcement Center. SELEC is a regional, 
intergovernmental organization facilitating cooperation between the law enforcement 
agencies of member states. The primary mission for SELEC is to prevent and combat 
transnational crime.  
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee. The UNSCR 
1540 Committee is a sub-committee of the United Nations Security Council and is 
charged with the implementation of UNSCR 1540. UNSCR 1540 affirms the 
proliferation of CBRN weapons, or related material, is a threat to international peace. The 
treaty obligates members to legislate and enact various non-proliferation measures. 
United Nations. The UN is an intergovernmental organization with a primary 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security. In addition, the UN encourages 
friendly relations between its member states to further international cooperation on a 
range of issues from humanitarian aid to human rights.   
Zangger Committee. The Zangger Committee is an intergovernmental 
organization comprising 39 member states. The purpose of the committee is to offer 
guidance to its member states by interpreting Article III, paragraph 2 of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty which specifies that fissionable-related material must be subjected to 






APPENDIX C.  DATA COLLECTION 
To assess the Counter Nuclear Smuggling-Europe network, it was necessary to 
construct a data set that valued specific relations between actors in the network. This 
appendix lists the references that were used to build the data set. The majority of the 
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